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Regulation's Rationale: Learning from the
California Energy Crisis
Timothy P. Duanet
Further deregulation of energy markets has been challenged by the
California energy crisis of 2000-2001 and the collapse of Enron. Many
observers have argued that these events are unrelated, and, therefore,
deregulation itself should not be questioned. Each disaster is just a
symptom, however, of something more fundamental and structural: the
failure of modern American political discourse to appreciate regulation's
rationale. In particular, both the California energy crisis and Enron's
collapse were caused by legislative and administrative failures to design
regulatory institutions that adequately constrained opportunistic behavior.
This Article challenges the conventional wisdom about what happened in
California and therefore challenges the conventional wisdom about what
should be done to avoid similar problems. This inquiry has relevance both
for other states considering deregulation (or its euphemistic cousin,
"restructuring'), as well as how the federal government approaches its
role in a partially-deregulated electricity market. The dominant story of
what happened in California is riddled with both factual and conceptual
errors, and those errors engendered a series of policy responses that
exacerbated, rather than alleviated, the underlying causes of the crisis.
Political discourse on the Bush Administration's National Energy Plan
suffers from similar problems. Our nation, therefore, runs a serious risk of
repeating the conditions that gave rise to the California energy crisis,
rather than learning from them.
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Introduction
The collapse of Enron Corporation,1 the criminal indictment of its
auditor Arthur Andersen,2 the bankruptcy of Pacific Gas and Electric
I Enron Corporation filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on December 2, 2001. The
Justice Department formed a task force to investigate the company in early January 2002. Kurt
Eichenwald & Jonathan D. Glater, Justice Dept. to Form Task Force To Investigate Collapse of Enron,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2002, at Al. Washington was also abuzz with concern about the close ties
between Chairman Ken Lay and President George W. Bush. See Robert Scheer, Connect the Enron
Dots to Bush, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2001, at B13. For a detailed account of Enron's rise and fall, see
Kurt Eichenwald, Audacious Climb to Success Ended in a Dizzying Plunge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002,
at A1; see also Bethany McLean, Why Enron Went Bust, FORTUNE, Dec. 24, 2001, at 58. Although I
had no personal stake in Enron, the University of California lost $144 million in Enron's collapse,
California teachers lost another $49 million, and the California public employees pension fund lost $40
million. See Leslie Wayne, Enron's Many Strands: Fallout, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2002, at A32.
2 The Department of Justice issued a criminal indictment for obstruction of justice against
Arthur Andersen of Chicago for destroying documents related to the Enron investigation on March 14,
2002. Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Charged with Obstruction in Enron Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15,
2002, at Al. Andersen previously settled shareholder lawsuits and/or regulatory actions against its
auditing practices regarding the books of Sunbeam and Waste Management, both of which also went
bankrupt. See Kurt Eichenwald & Floyd Norris, Enron's Auditor Says It Destroyed Documents, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2002, at Cl.
Regulation's Rationale
Company,3 and the rolling blackouts and price spikes of the California
energy crisis of 2000-2001 all have one thing in common: They were
caused by legislative and administrative failures to design regulatory
institutions that adequately constrained opportunistic behavior. Each of
these specific events has more proximate causes as well, of course, and
many analyses will probably point to specific circumstances that suggest
each is an aberration. There is great temptation to blame the Enron
collapse on unethical, and perhaps illegal, behavior,4 for example, while
the dominant narrative of the California crisis places blame on California
legislators and regulators for poorly implementing electricity deregulation.
For some, the collapse of Enron illustrates the power of market forces to
make intelligent judgments swiftly and without political consideration,5
and the California crisis would have been averted if politicians had been
willing to rely more on the market than politics. Such a perspective leaves
the basic thrust of the deregulation project intact. Why throw the baby of
deregulation out with the dirty bathwater of Enron's greed and California's
incompetence? This view is quite dangerous, however, if we are going to
learn useful lessons from these events. Each crisis is, in fact, a symptom of
a more fundamental and structural problem: the failure of modern
American political discourse to appreciate regulation's rationale.6
This Article will explore these issues more deeply with respect to the
California energy crisis. In particular, I will correct several common
misperceptions about what happened in California and, therefore,
challenge the conventional wisdom about what should be done to avoid
similar problems in the future. This inquiry has relevance both for other
states considering deregulation (or its euphemistic cousin, "restructuring"),
as well as for how the federal government approaches its role in a partially
deregulated electricity market. Both Congress and the Federal Energy
3 Pacific Gas and Electric Company of San Francisco filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection on April 6, 2002. The relationship between its bankruptcy filing and the California energy
crisis is discussed in detail later in this Article. See infra Section III.C.
4 By August 2001, even some of Enron's senior managers were concerned about these
practices. Sherron Watkins, a former Andersen auditor who served as Enron's vice president for
corporate development, sent a detailed memo to Kenneth Lay in August 2001 raising serious questions
about the accounting treatment of"off balance sheet" entitites. Her frankness and integrity stand out as
exemplary in the Enron debacle. Jim Yardley, Author of Letter to Enron Chief is Called Tough, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2002, at AI (the full text of her letter was reproduced at C6).
5 Following Enron's collapse, Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill said, "Companies come and
go. It's part of the genius of capitalism." White House economic advisor Lawrence B. Lindsey
described the event as a "tribute to American capitalism." Paul Krugman, A System Corrupted, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at A25. Neoclassical economic theory is not based on cronyism and corruption,
however, which both appear to have been features of Enron's culture.
6 For commentaries on the Enron crisis as just a symptom of our culture, see, for example,
John Balzar, Enron: A Scandal So Good That It Hurts, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at B 17; and
Marjorie Kelly, Waving Goodbye to the Invisible Hand: How the Enron Mess Grew and Grew, S.F.
CHRON., Feb. 24, 2002, at DI, available at http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/
archive/2002/02/24/HN83497.DTL (last visited Apr. 22, 2002).
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Regulatory Commission ("FERC") would do well to examine the
California case more carefully.' The dominant story of what happened in
California is riddled with both factual and conceptual errors, and those
errors propagated a series of policy responses that exacerbated, rather than
alleviated, the underlying causes of the crisis.' Many of the same errors
appear to permeate the Bush Administration's recently developed National
Energy Plan. Learning from the California experience, therefore, has
national relevance.
What are the implications of the Enron scandal to this inquiry? Enron
was both a leader and prime beneficiary of electricity market deregulation
throughout the nation, and it played a central role in the California crisis.9
In particular, the pervasiveness of Enron's relationships with policymakers
illustrates how corporate interests are interwoven with legislative and
administrative decision-makers to the point that they are often unable to
consider the broader public interest when formulating and implementing
policy. 0 Just as Enron's collapse has precipitated Congressional action on
7 The scope of FERC's authority to regulate electricity markets was recently addressed by
the U.S. Supreme Court in New York v. FERC, 122 S.Ct. 1012 (2002).
8 The power of rhetoric or narrative to frame both the "problem" and policy responses
cannot be overstated. For an illustrative example in the context of electricity planning and regulation,
see JAMES A. THROGMORTON, PLANNING AS PERSUASIVE STORYTELLING: THE RHETORICAL
CONSTRUCTION OF CHICAGO'S ELECTRIC FUTURE (1996). 1 recognize that I am engaged in a similar
exercise by reframing the narrative through this Article. I also recognize that my interpretation will be
contested. Arthur O'Donnell, Bottom Lines: Revisionist History 101, in CAL. ENERGY MARKETS No.
659 (Mar. 8, 2002), http://www.newsdata.comi/cemlblines.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2002).
9 Richard A. Oppel, Jr. and Jeff Gerth, Enron Forced Up California Prices, Documents
Show, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2002, at Al. Internal Enron memoranda describe a number of market
manipulation strategies, but these documents were unavailable for any detailed analysis at this Article
went to press. Enron has resisted subpoenas for such documents issued by California investigators. Cf
supra note 210.
10 Senator Ernest Hollings has said "[l]n my 35 years in the Senate, I have never witnessed
a corporation so extraordinarily committed to buying government. In the last decade, Enron gave
campaign contributions to 186 House members and 71 senators, including $3,500 to me." Ernest F.
Hollings, Editorial, Time for a Special Counsel, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2002, at A27. Enron, its
employees, and its political action committee made "soft money" donations equaling an astounding
$1.143 million to Republicans and $532,065 to Democrats in 1999 and in 2000 alone. Dollars and
Cents: Enron 's Political Giving, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2002, at B4 (table). Enron also gave generously
to some key Democratic politicians, but the Bush Administration is filled with officials who have ties
to Enron. Attorney General John Ashcroft and his key deputy had to recuse themselves from the
Justice Department investigation, while the leading fundraiser for the Republican Party is a former
Enron lobbyist. Richard L. Berke, G.O.P. Weighs Chief's Stance on Enron Tie, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18,
2002, at A16. Secretary of the Army Thomas E. White is a former senior Enron manager who sold his
Enron shares for $10 million. Alex Berenson, Army Official Kept Options on Enron Stock Until
January, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2002, at Cl. Texas Senator Phil Gramm's wife, Wendy, joined the
Enron board shortly after weakening regulatory oversight of the company while as a member of the
Commodity Futures Exchange Commission. She subsequently served on the Enron board's audit
committee and earned between $915,000 and $1.85 million from Enron from 1993 to 2001. Bob
Herbert, Enron and the Gramms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, at A29; Alison Mitchell, Enron 's Ties to
a Leader of House Republicans Went Beyond Contributions to His Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
2002, at Cl; Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Don Van Natta, Jr., Bush and Democrats Disputing Ties to
Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2002, at Cl. Conservative political strategist Ralph Reed was also given
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campaign finance reform, the relationship between Enron and
policymakers should give pause to those considering a further extension of
electricity deregulation consistent with Enron's vision. Instead, it is time to
step back and re-think some fundamental assumptions. Why did we
abandon the previous regulated, cost-of-service system for providing
electricity services? What are the benefits and risks of going forward with
further deregulation or restructuring of the electricity industry? Is further
deregulation inexorably destined? Most importantly, what is the proper
role for regulation in relation to whatever form of electricity market and
industry that we now have?
The answers to these questions require an inquiry into both the
historical rationale for electricity industry regulation and the specific
history of how California altered that system. I will demonstrate in this
Article that an understanding of both the specific regulatory history of the
industry and technically complex economic and engineering analysis is
necessary for the development of successful policy and the design of
enduring institutions that meet the broad purposes of promoting the public
interest. We would do well, therefore, to incorporate similar analyses into
our consideration of what to do next in all regulatory arenas
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I describe the original
rationale for electricity regulation in the United States and how the "utility
consensus" that dominated the industry from the 1920s began to erode in
the 1970s. I then show how California responded to the challenges of the
1970s in an unusual way, charting a path that emphasized improved end-
use efficiency, robust development of alternative generation sources, and
adoption of an integrated resource planning approach by the late-1980s.
Part II shows how this approach was challenged by national deregulation
efforts and industry restructuring in the 1990s. In particular, I describe the
specific market and regulatory structure adopted by California in response
to those pressures and how that structure laid the foundation for the crisis
of 2000-2001. Part III then examines the proximate causes of the crisis and
the inadequacy of policy responses by both state and federal regulators.
Part IV explores alternative policy options and discusses the ramifications
of the adopted responses for the future of California. The Conclusion then
presents specific lessons for regulating electricity markets from my
analysis of the California crisis. It also suggests that there are more general
an Enron contract for $10,000 to $20,000 per month during the Bush campaign for President,
apparently to ensure his support for Bush. Richard L. Berke, Associates of Bush Aide Say He Helped
Strategist Win an Enron Contract, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2002, at Cl. Enron also paid a wide range of
influential figures $50,000 per year to serve on its advisory board-including President Bush's senior
economic advisor, Lawrence B. Lindsey. David E. Sanger & Don Van Natta, Jr., White House Says
Economics Adviser Saw Little Risk on Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, at Cl. New York Times
columnist Paul Krugman also served on the advisory group. Paul Krugman, Enron Goes Overboard,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2001, at Al9.
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lessons regarding regulation's rationale in a wide variety of contexts.
These lessons have potentially profound implications for our entire
society.
I. Evolutionary Regulation: When the State Still Played a Central Role
A. The "Utility Consensus": 1920s-1970s
The history of modem electricity regulation begins a century ago with
the development of what Richard F. Hirsh calls the "utility consensus" in
the United States to regulate investor-owned electric utilities as "natural
monopolies."" Michael D. Reagan describes the natural monopoly
argument for regulation, which he himself challenges as the primary
motivation for regulation, in this way:
The meaning is that the competitive running of wires and pipes above or
below the ground in duplicate, triplicate, or more would be so obviously
inefficient and costly a use of resources that we "naturally" permit
monopolistic supply of such goods with decreasing average costs.
However, price gouging of the consumer will not be prevented by the
classic 'workings of the competitive elements, and too little electricity
will be produced and consumed, so regulation substitutes for the missing
competition.
12
The theory of natural monopoly has been the subject of extensive study by
economists, 3 and it is a standard part of any college-level introductory
economics course. Economic theory alone is insufficient to explain the
development of the "utility consensus," however, and the institutional
literature is dominated by two general explanations for regulation: (1) that
"the rise of regulatory programs could be explained as a response to
political demands from victimized groups for protection,"' 14 or (2) that
"regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated for its
benefit."' 5 These two rationales converged in the case of electricity. The
regulatory approach adopted in the U.S. granted individual companies
11 RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER Loss: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND
RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM 11 (1999).
12 MICHAEL D. REAGAN, REGULATION: THE POLITICS OF POLICY 36-37 (1987).
13 See, e.g., WILLIAM W. SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY (1982). Some
empirical studies of this assumption, however, have found lower costs in some areas with direct
competition. See WALTER J. PRIMEAUX, JR., DIRECT ELECTRIC UTILITY COMPETITION: THE NATURAL
MONOPOLY MYTH (1986).
14 REAGAN, supra note 12, at 28.





exclusive franchises to provide power within a specific geographic area as
long as their rates were regulated by state regulatory commissions based
on the cost of providing service, including a reasonable return on
investment. This arrangement simultaneously served the political goals of
preventing monopoly abuses (to the benefit of ratepayers) and staving off
efforts by municipalities to take over the private systems (to the benefit of
utility company shareholders). As Edward Kahn puts it, "[riegulation
provided stability by limiting competition, while controlling the worst
monopoly abuses."' 6
Michael D. Reagan places regulation of the electricity industry within
the historical (political) context of the 1887 establishment of the Interstate
Commerce Commission ("ICC"), which initially regulated railroad rates to
prevent monopoly abuses over grain shipments on many shipping routes.
Concern about "the growing economic power of late nineteenth century
industrialization"'' 7 led to Congressional passage of the anti-trust statutes
(in particular, the Sherman Act of 1890,18 the Clayton Act of 1914,19 and
the Federal Trade Commission Act of 191420). Neither these statutes, nor
indirect oversight by the ICC or the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"),
were deemed adequate to curb the monopoly risks attending electricity
generation, however, due to some of the distinguishing technological
characteristics of the industry. In particular, the need to produce electricity
instantaneously at the moment it is consumed means that shortages cannot
be alleviated (economically) through storage.2' This lack of storage
capability increases the likelihood of both volatile prices and periodic
shortages. Moreover, the interconnectedness of the electricity grid means
that shortages on any part of the grid could threaten the stability of the
22entire system.
These distinctive technological features also make the electricity
industry especially vulnerable to market power abuse: Any generator
controlling any amount of generation capacity necessary to meet the
demand at a given moment can threaten to blackout the entire grid by
16 EDWARD KAHN, ELECTRIC UTILITY PLANNING & REGULATION I (1988).
17 REAGAN, supra note 12, at 20-21.
18 ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000)).
19 ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 29
U.S.C.)
20 ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2000)).
21 Either consumers, producers, or intermediaries can store electricity in batteries or invest
in stand-by generation to reduce the risk of shortages, but these capital-intensive technologies are
extremely costly compared to ensuring reliability for the entire grid through investments in system-
wide generation that will be used more frequently.
22 This threat can occur due to either frequency or voltage considerations. This is why
California instituted rolling blackouts from January 2001 to May 2001-By "dropping" the load
(demand) from a limited number of customers, the integrity of the rest of the grid could be maintained
as long as the remaining generation could meet the remaining demand.
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withholding power from the market. Such a generator can therefore
demand almost an infinite price for the last (necessary) units of electricity,
because all consumers' demand will go unmet if that price is not paid. The
alternative to shortages is, therefore, highly volatile prices and recurring
risks of outages, which present an economic climate that is too unstable
and unpredictable for broader business investment.23 Sam Insull also
shows how, from 1911 to 1913, ever-larger generating units lowered per-
unit costs just as expanding markets allowed greater efficiencies through
complementary use patterns among different customers.24 Individual firms,
therefore, tended to acquire complete control of electricity markets within
specific areas, presenting opportunities for monopolistic abuses.
Regulation theoretically prevented such abuses and stabilized the
economic climate for an increasingly essential input to economic activity
while ensuring continued profits for investors. Whether motivated
primarily by the interests of consumers or producers or both, cost-of-
service regulation became the utility consensus, and it was adopted in
some form by nearly every state in the nation.2 5 As Bruce M. Owen and
Ronald Braeutigam suggest, this was not resisted by the industry: "No
industry offered the opportunity to be regulated should decline it. Few
industries have done so."
2 6
Many commentators' analyses of how the "utility consensus"
developed, including Hirsh's, are laid out within an institutional
perspective that focuses on the role of various elites in the formation of
public policy. 27 With the rise of public choice theory, regulators' behavior
has been scrutinized primarily in terms of allocating benefits among the
23 Such an unstable and unpredictable electricity system would also burden residential
consumers, of course, as well as threaten public health and safety through the loss of power to
hospitals and traffic safety lights. Electricity has, therefore, generally been deemed an "essential"
public service due to our society's extensive reliance on it. This same rationale explains public control
over most water systems, although recent moves to privatize water supply are based primarily on
economic critiques of the natural monopoly argument. Implementation of such privatization has met
stiff political resistance in many places, however, due to broad equity concerns as well as specific
resistance by existing bureaucracies. Isabelle Fauconnier, Privatized Water, Retreating State: Access
and Affordability Issues for Public-Private Good in Developing Country Settings, Presentation Before
the Department of City and Regional Planning, University of California, Berkeley (Nov. 19, 2001)
(dissertation draft, University of California, Berkeley) (on file with author).
24 KAHN, supra note 16, at 3-7.
25 Nebraska's entire electrical grid is public, but it also bases its rates on a cost-of-service
formula.
26 BRUCE M. OWEN & RONALD BRAEUTIGAM, THE REGULATION GAME: STRATEGIC USE
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 2 (1978).
27 Popular histories tend to emphasize the inherently political nature of regulation of the
industry. See, e.g., RICHARD MUNSON, THE POWER MAKERS: THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA'S
BIGGEST BUSINESS... AND ITS STRUGGLE TO CONTROL TOMORROW'S ELECTRICITY (1985); RICHARD





elites competing for the regulators' favor.28 The debate among those elites,
like so much of public policy for the past quarter-century, is typically
characterized as being primarily about the economic efficiency of
regulation. However, as Michael Reagan emphasizes, this is not
necessarily the sole, or even primary, historic rationale for regulation.
Recent historical accounts, therefore, sometimes have an ahistorical
quality to them. 9 Municipalization efforts, and the movement for public
power more generally, clearly also reflected concerns about access to
power and the potential for discriminatory behavior by monopolists.
Practical equity concerns were therefore as important politically as
theoretical economic rationales."' Most other nations (and some
communities or regions of the United States) generally chose public
ownership and control of the electric utility industry rather than a
regulated, privately-owned system.31 Much of the recent debate over the
purposes of deregulation and restructuring in the electricity industry has
taken for granted that the economic logic of "natural monopolies" is the
primary rationale for regulation. As a result, the discourse has generally
failed to explore the broader social and political reasons for these
institutional choices.
This distinction between economic and social/political explanations
for regulation of the electric utility industry was academic for decades, for
the utility consensus seemed to work to most parties' benefit from the
28 See, e.g., DOUGLAS D. ANDERSON, REGULATORY POLITICS AND ELECTRIC UTILITIES: A
CASE STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1981); OWEN & BRAEUTIGAM, supra note 26; Sam Peltzman,
Towards a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976). For a wide range of
examples going beyond electricity regulation, see generally THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (James Q.
Wilson ed., 1980).
29 As Michael Reagan explained:
Economists and economic principles so thoroughly dominate contemporary
writings on regulation that today's students may find it strange that prominent
earlier (1940s-1960s) books on regulation most often reflected a political
approach, the primary theme being that the rise of regulatory programs could best
be explained as a response to political demands from victimized groups for
protection. In turn, these group demands were seen as the concrete manifestations
of a very broad and basic societal adjustment to the realities of economic power,
which developed as a function of the unfettered industrial capitalism of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
REAGAN, supra note 12, at 28. In contrast, he notes that "[e]conomists, rather than political scientists
and legal scholars, supply the analytic framework for the current conventional wisdom." Id. at v.
30 One need only read Frank Norris' 1901 polemic The Octopus (1901) against the Central
Pacific railroad to understand the political motivation for the establishment of the California Public
Utilities Commission ("CPUC") in 1911. See GEORGE E. MOWRY, THE CALIFORNIA PROGRESSIVES
11-12 (1951) for the political details of the birth of the CPUC, which makes no mention of natural
monopoly theory and does not feature any economists.
31 Approximately three-fourths of U.S. power was supplied by investor-owned utilities in
1984, while only about one-fourth of the world's power was privately controlled. HIRSH, supra note
11, at app. 274 tbl.A.1.
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1920s until the 1970s.32 Utility managers dominated what was essentially a
"closed system" during this period, but regulators didn't seem to mind:
Their job was simply to pass along the savings associated with ever-
declining costs as economies of scale allowed ever-expanding demand to
be met with little controversy through expanded supply. State utility
regulatory commissions were therefore of little interest to either politicians
or voters for most of this period of expansion. Concern about regulatory
"capture" by the regulated industry seemed to be only of academic interest.
Californians established the California Public Utilities Commission
("CPUC") in 1911, at the peak of the Progressive movement to watch over
the state's three large investor-owned utilities.33 Pacific Gas and Electric
Company ("PG&E"), Southern California Edison Company ("Edison"),
and San Diego Gas and Electric Company ("SDGandE") each had an
obligation under the regulatory regime to serve all of the customers within
their service territories at "just and reasonable rates" authorized by the
CPUC. Other Californians received power from public utilities like the
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power or the Sacramento
Municipal Utility District, which were not subject to CPUC jurisdiction.34
Instead, those ratepayers could exercise oversight of utility rates at the
ballot box. Ratepayers throughout California certainly expressed their ire
whenever rate increases were proposed, but the rates themselves were set
based upon the cost of providing service. This was true for both public and
private utilities.35
32 There were prominent exceptions, of course, including those who held worthless utility
stocks following the stock market crash of 1929. A variety of abuses led the Senate in 1928 to
authorize the FTC to hold hearings on the industry. The FTC hearings were later instrumental in
adoption of both the Federal Power Act of 1935, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 791-793, 796-818, 820-825 (2000)) and the Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935
(PUHCA), ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 79 (2000)). See CARL D.
THOMPSON, CONFESSIONS OF THE POWER TRUST (1932) (stating in the subtitle that the book is "a
summary of the testimony given in the hearings of the Federal Trade Commission on utility
corporations pursuant to Resolution No. 83 of the United States Senate approved February 15, 1928").
Thompson was Secretary of the Public Ownership League of America at the time.
33 The California Public Utilities Commission was established by the Public Utilities Act of
1911 as the successor to the California Railroad Commission, which was established in 1879 at the
state constitutional convention but was generally believed to be "captured" by the railroad. MOWRY,
supra note 30, at 18.
34 Los Angeles regained control of its municipal water supply in 1902, and power
generation was an ancillary benefit of the city's Owens Valley water supply project. Voters approved
bonds for the generating facilities in 1910 and voted to municipalize the distribution system in 1911.
The aqueduct project was completed in 1913. All of the private electrical utilities within the city of Los
Angeles were municipalized by 1936. NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST: CALIFORNIANS
AND WATER, 1770s-1 990s, at 139-40, 152-53 (1992). The Sacramento Municipal Utility District was
carved out of PG&E's franchise territory in 1946. JAMES C. WILLIAMS, ENERGY AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN CALIFORNIA 266 (1997).
35 Public utilities in California have historically had lower rates than private utilities for
three reasons: (1) They often had access, like Los Angeles, to low-cost hydropower sites that were




Why did we abandon this system? Richard F. Hirsh's account is the
most recent and the most comprehensive. Yet, Hirsch fails to provide an
adequately critical assessment of the recent deregulation and restructuring
turn. Perhaps this is because his perspective was colored by the time
period in which he wrote; he did not have the benefit of the events that
happened in 2000-2001. He therefore asks, "What led the elites to change
the system?" rather than, "How on earth did the citizens of the state let the
elites change the system in a way that allowed rolling blackouts,
skyrocketing rates, utility bankruptcies, stonewalled investigations,
document destruction, and the effective insolvency of California itself?"
Not surprisingly, the two questions lead to two very different frameworks
for analysis and potentially very different answers. Hirsh's analysis, like
most recent scholarship on the political economy of electricity regulation,
largely stays within the boundaries of the discourse among the elites.
Nevertheless, Hirsh offers the most useful source for understanding
the context of the California crisis. Like others, he traces the collapse of
the utility consensus to three unanticipated crises in the industry in the
1970s:
Coming first, the arrest of technological progress along traditional lines
constituted a catastrophe to executives who depended on improved
hardware to drive their industry's expansion. Next, the energy crisis of
1973 affected the market for electricity by dramatically increasing the
price of power, while also motivating political leaders to intervene in the
system for the first time in decades. Finally, the modem environmental
movement expressed a set of values about nature and humankind's place
in it that questioned the widely accepted ideology of growth.36
These stresses created the conditions for the passage of PURPA, the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978.37 Although most lobbying
attention focused on the rate reform aspects of the bill (which
institutionalized economists' desire to have marginal-cost pricing replace
average-cost pricing in electric utility regulation), Section 210 allowed
"qualifying facilities" ("QFs") that were either run on renewable energy
sources or burned fossil fuel more efficiently through co-generation (the
simultaneous production of steam for industrial processes and electricity)
to challenge "the monopoly control enjoyed by regulated utilities."3
federal dams in the west, marketed by the Western Area Power Authority, and (3) they do not need to
earn a return on capital to ensure shareholder investment value.
36 HIRSH, supra note 1l, at 55.
37 Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117.
38 HIRSH, supra note 11, at 73.
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State-by-state implementation of PURPA then allowed a fifty-
laboratory test of how non-utility generation might be developed. PURPA
had little impact in most states, as industry-captured regulatory
commissions protected the existing utility monopolies by offering only
token prices for QF power while making it difficult for individual QFs to
arrange contracts to sell their power to utilities. California responded much
more aggressively with PURPA, however, and the state soon developed
the largest number of non-utility owned QFs in the country. This proved to
be an important institutional condition preceding the California crisis.
By 1991, non-utility companies produced fully a third of California's
electrical energy.39 Nationally, non-utility generation accounted for just
about three percent of total generating capacity in 1991-its lowest level
since 1970, when it accounted for more than five percent of capacity.
40
National production from this non-utility capacity had grown steadily,
however, since the passage of PURPA-from 6,034 million kilowatt-hours
(kwh) in 1979 to 136,550 million kwh in 1991.41 Many of these new non-
utility generating units were cheaper to build and operate than new large-
scale utility facilities. They were also typically small and decentralized,
further challenging utility dominance. As Hirsh notes, "the new
technologies weakened the justification for natural monopoly status of the
power companies, spurring policy makers to reconsider the wisdom of
granting special privileges to the regulated firms." 42 PURPA, therefore, set
the stage for broader deregulation of the industry.
B. The California Model. 1970s-1990s
Although the changes in national policy discourse brought about by
PURPA were important, there were other key policy decisions California
made during the 1970s and 1980s that are poorly understood and are worth
reviewing here. In many respects, California's approach during this time
constituted a complete challenge to the dominant regulatory paradigm of
the time, as well as the deregulatory approaches adopted over the past
decade. The state's specific policy choices in the 1970s and 1980s also
play a critical role in any nuanced analysis of the California energy crisis
of 2000-2001. Many observers appear to lack a nuanced understanding of
this complex history, so it is not surprising that many of the prescriptions
for resolving the crisis have been misguided.
California faced a difficult challenge when the 1973 oil crisis hit the
country: Its population had jumped from fifteen million in 1960 to twenty
39 Id. at 93.
40 Id. at 115 fig.6.7.
41 Id. at 116 fig.6.8.
42 Id. at 117.
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million in 1970, and would add another ten million by 1990. Like the rest
of the country, California's investor-owned utilities were forecasting
continuing demand growth that would require many more power plants:
According to a 1972 Rand Corporation study for the legislature, energy
consumption would be four times greater in 1991 than 1970. The study
projected that the state would need the equivalent of about 130 new power
plants (for a total installed capacity of over 150,000 MW of supply) by the
year 2000. 43 Building this many new plants would present significant
siting challenges at a time when public values for environmental protection
were being institutionalized. The utilities, therefore, pushed for a one-stop
permitting agency while environmentalists sought a new regulatory body
with independent analytic abilities to evaluate the utilities' proposals.
Governor Ronald Reagan first vetoed a bill to establish the California
Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission (which
met both the utilities' and the environmentalists' goals) just four days
before Israel was attacked in October 1973, but he reluctantly signed a
modified version of the bill in May 197444 after the 1973 Arab Oil
Embargo had precipitated a crisis atmosphere on energy issues.45
The California Energy Commission ("CEC"), as the agency was
commonly known, quickly instituted a new paradigm of electric utility
resource planning when Democrat Jerry Brown replaced Reagan as
governor in January 1975.46 It began by challenging the very models used
by utilities to forecast demand: Rather than assuming that economic
growth was directly correlated with energy consumption, the CEC
developed an end-use forecasting model that allowed policymakers and
planners to examine opportunities to substitute improved end-use
efficiency for new supply. Conservation and efficiency, in other words,
could be considered sources of new "supply." Following the arguments
laid out by Amory Lovins in 1976,47 California policymakers accepted the
concept that "negawatts" could be just as valuable as megawatts-and that
society demanded "energy services" (the goods and services made possible
43 R.D. DOCTOR ET AL., CALIFORNIA'S ELECTRICITY QUANDARY: III. SLOWING THE
GROWTH RATE x-xi (Rand Energy Program, Study No. R-1 16-NSF/CSA, 1972); see also HIRSH, supra
note 11, at 94.
44 Warren-Alquist Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 25000-25008 (West 1996).
45 Oil was used to produce just 7% of American electricity supplied in 1962, but oil
accounted for 14% of output in 1970 and nearly 20% by 1973. HIRSH, supra note 11, at 60. Oil prices
increased six-fold between Reagan's initial veto and his signature just seven months later as Arab
members of OPEC exercised oligopolistic market power.
46 Brown was elected govemor in November 1974 and took office in January 1975. He
remained in office through 1982, and his influence dominated the first decade of the CEC through the
staggered terms of his appointees to the Commission. During that time, the CEC aggressively
promoted renewable technology development and the adoption of energy efficiency standards for
appliances and buildings. The CEC was then substantially weakened under Republican Governors
George Deukmajian and Pete Wilson from 1983-1998.
47 Amory B. Lovins, Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken?, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 65 (1976).
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by energy) rather than energy per se. Demand-side management ("DSM")
could therefore obviate the need for new power plants "faster, cheaper, and
cleaner" than the traditional supply-side approach.48 The structure of the
CEC system was relatively simple: (1) A comprehensive assessment
process would project end-use demand every two years and identify
available sources of supply or demand reduction (through either direct
programs with utility consumers or regulatory standards for new
appliances or buildings); (2) the CEC would determine the forecast "need"
for such new resources (forecast demand minus existing supply); and (3)
the CEC would adopt regulatory standards or request support for
conservation programs through the CPUC (which had control over utility
rates) where such standards or programs were cost-effective. Utilities then
needed to meet the CEC's "demand conformance test" in order to get a
permit to build a new power plant-unless there was already an identified
need for new supply, no siting permit could be issued by the CEC. This
process shifted the question of "need" from project-by-project permitting
decisions to a broader, more comprehensive planning process.
49
Higher utility rates, regulatory standards for improved end-use
efficiency in new appliances and building designs, and structural changes
in the California economy then proceeded to cut California's annual rate of
demand growth by 75% to 80% over the subsequent two decades. The
apparent "need" for 100,000 MW of new utility power plants largely
evaporated as California substituted efficiency for smokestacks and
waste. ° This is a remarkable record: California literally avoided the
48 This argument has recently been repeated in response to the Bush Administration's
heavily supply-oriented National Energy Plan (where Vice President Dick Cheney has dismissed
conservation as a "lifestyle choice" rather than a viable element of energy policy) and was also
advanced by environmentalists during the 2000-2001 California crisis. However, it has already been
tested as a key element in public policy and utility system planning in California from 1975 to 1995.
Therefore, there is an empirical basis for determining whether or not its proponents' claims have been
realized. See Joseph Kahn, Cheney Promotes Increasing Supply As Energy Policy, N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
2001, at Al; David E. Sanger & Joseph Kahn, Bush, Pushing Energy Plan, Offers Scores of Proposals
to Find New Power Sources, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2001, at Al. For a contrary view that challenges
the Vice-President's assertion, see Timothy Egan, Many Utilities Call Conserving Good Business,
N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2001, at Al.
49 The utility also still had to get separate approval from the CPUC to recover through rates
the costs of building and operating new facilities, which created a regulatory inefficiency and
additional risk for new utility-owned facilities. The lack of clearly articulated connections between the
CEC and CPUC processes caused a series of problems in the 1980s as California shifted away from the
traditional utility-centered, project-by-project approach. See Tim Duane, Electricity Regulation
Reform, in 6 CAL. POL'Y CHOICES 205 (John J. Kirlan & Donald R. Winkler eds., 1990).
50 California's annual electricity consumption grew by only 1.7% per year from 1977 to
1999. This contrasts with historic rates of 7% to 8% before 1973 and an average annual growth rate of
3.1% from 1977 to 1999 for all of the states in the Western System Coordinating Council ("WSCC")
area (Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Washington, and
Wyoming). California's peak demand grew from about 36,000 MW in 1982 to approximately 56,000
MW in 2000. Installed generating capacity grew during the same period from 35,000 MW in 1977 to
approximately 53,000 MW in 2000. JOLANKA V. FISHER & TIMOTHY P. DUANE, TRENDS IN
ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION, PEAK DEMAND, AND GENERATING CAPACITY IN CALIFORNIA AND THE
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construction of hundreds of new power plants that were projected to be
built from 1970 to 2000. More than just a "lifestyle choice," the state
firmly established that conservation, demand-side management, and
improved end-use efficiency could cost-effectively meet the rapidly
growing state's energy services needs. Contrary to Vice President
Cheney's assertion, California clearly demonstrated that conservation can
be a solid policy plank.
The new regulatory approach still encountered some difficulties in its
initial decade. For example, the utilities had already begun construction on
several major generating projects that were not subject to the CEC's
regulatory oversight when the CEC first implemented its biennial resource
planning process and demand conformance permit system. Cost overruns,
construction errors, and regulatory delays meant that those plants were not
coming on-line as quickly as expected."' The state, therefore, faced very
slim reserve margins in the early-1980s that threatened the reliability of
the grid.52 It was in this context that the CPUC decided to jump-start the
alternative energy market by aggressively implementing PURPA. As Hirsh
put it, "the law found a true home in California, 53 "largely because the
state's utilities had fallen behind schedule in constructing new power
WESTERN GRID 1977-2000 (Program on Workable Energy Regulation, Working Paper No. PWP-085,
September 2001), available at http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/ucei/PDF/pwp085.pdf. An addendum
with demand and capacity figures from 1999 to 2000 in California only (but not the rest of the WSCC)
was completed by Fisher and Duane in December 2001. Jolanka V. Fisher & Timothy P. Duane,
Presentation at the University of California P.O.W.E.R. Conference, Berkeley, Cal. (Mar. 22, 2002)
(addendum on file with Yale Journal on Regulation).
51 In particular, delays in completion of the PG&E's Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant
and Edison's San Onofre nuclear generating station reduced baseload generating capacity. The
California utilities were not unique in facing such delays and cost overruns, of course. See James
Cook, Nuclear Follies, FORBES, Feb. 11, 1985, at 82. The entire industry faced new safety
requirements and permitting delays after the Three Mile Island accident in March 1979, but orders
were already being cancelled due to cost overruns, and no plants ordered between 1974 and 1985 have
ever been completed in the United States. Id. PG&E's Diablo Canyon facility had additional problems
associated with seismic retrofits to deal with a nearby earthquake fault that had not been considered
during the design phase. The initial seismic retrofit was then installed backwards, necessitating
additional delays and cost overruns. Ultimately, the CPUC's Division of Ratepayer Advocates
("DRA") argued that ratepayers should pay just $1.4 billion of the $5.6 billion price tag for the plant.
The original cost estimate was less than $400 million. The CPUC ultimately approved a complicated
performance-based ratemaking scheme that allowed PG&E to recover most of the costs. (There is
considerable debate today whether PG&E has been made whole under the system.).
52 The reserve margin is the amount of generating capacity on "reserve" when the system is
meeting the peak demand. A peak demand of 90 MW with 100 MW of generating capacity therefore
yields a reserve margin of 10%. PG&E's reserve margin dropped to as low as 6% in 1981, while the
industry then "viewed 20% as a comfortable margin." HIRSH, supra note 11, at 95. Industry practice
under the regulated cost-of-service system estimated that a 20% margin would yield a loss of load
probability of one day of outages for the entire system every ten years. KAHN, supra note 16, at 83.
The California Independent System Operator now declares a "Stage I" emergency whenever reserve
margins reach 7%, a "Stage 2" emergency at 3%, and a "Stage 3" emergency (when rolling blackouts
begin in order to maintain the integrity of the grid) at 1.5%.
53 HIRSH, supra note 11, at 93.
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plants., 54 Most states only required utilities to purchase from QFs at only
the short-run utility operating costs that were "avoided" by the purchases
from the QFs, but the CPUC instituted a payment structure in 1983 that
was based on the projected "long run avoided cost" the utilities would
otherwise incur to build and operate new power plants.55 Moreover, the
CPUC adopted "standard offer" contracts that included some fixed prices
based on forecast energy prices. For renewable energy projects, the
payments were even front-loaded, because initial rates were higher than
short-run avoided costs. 56 The result was dramatic: Utilities signed
contracts for over 15,000 MW of new power supply from QFs from 1983
to 1985.57
Unfortunately, many of these contracts soon seemed uneconomic
from the perspectives of both the utilities and their ratepayers. The utilities
completed several large nuclear power plants and one large pumped-
storage hydroelectric project shortly after the "gold rush" of new QF
contracts, making the need for power both much less critical from a
reliability standpoint and much less economic (although similar in average
cost to the new utility-owned generating facilities).,8 Now, those expensive
new utility investments also had to be incorporated into the rate base-
which meant that rates would have to increase significantly. Finally, oil
and gas prices dropped despite the forecast that they would continue to
increase.59 The result was a short-term "oversupply" of high-priced power
which led the legislature to call for joint CPUC-CEC hearings in 1987 and
1988.60 Those hearings led the CPUC to promise to rely more upon the
54 Id. at 95.
55 The terms of these contracts were the result of intensive negotiations in a complex
settlement conference among utilities, QFs, ratepayer groups, and CPUC staff. The underlying
assumptions regarding future energy prices therefore did not go through the usual level of scrutiny that
would occur in the CPUC's quasi-judicial process.
56 These contracts were known as "Interim Standard Offer Four" ("1S04") contracts, and
they were available from September 1983 until April 1985. I worked in the Commercialization of
Alternative Technologies section of the PG&E Generation Planning Department from September 1983
to September 1984 and served as a consultant to the PG&E Generation Planning Department in 1985
and 1986. 1 also served as a consultant to some QFs who had such contracts from 1985 to 1990,
representing them in regulatory proceedings before the CPUC and CEC. I have not worked directly for
any utilities, generators, or other market participants in California regulatory proceedings since
December 1990.
57 HIRSH, supra note 11, at 97.
58 This problem reflected a fundamental failure by the CPUC to coordinate its QF contract
terms and prices with the CEC-identified need through the biennial resource planning process. Most of
the QFs were outside the siting jurisdiction of the CEC (because they either relied on renewable
resources or were less than 50 MW in size), so they could be built even if there was no longer any
identified "need." See Duane, supra note 49, at 217-19.
59 The primary driver of these lower prices was improved efficiency, as the U.S. economy
increased energy productivity by thirty percent from 1973 to 1986. This slackened global demand for
oil, which reduced pressure on prices. Substitution of other fuels for oil (especially in the electric
generation sector) also played an important role.
60 Duane, supra note 49, at 216-17.
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CEC's biennial resource planning process when making decisions about
future QF contracts or other sources of new utility-owned supply.61 The
CPUC also decided to rely upon a market-based bidding system to procure
those new supplies. The market would therefore establish the means, but
not the ends, of California electric supply.
The Biennial Resource Plan Update ("BRPU") process developed by
the CPUC in the late-1980s and early-1990s basically had three steps: (1)
identify the "need" for new supply based on the CEC's biennial resource
plan process; (2) determine the identifiable deferrable resource that the
utilities would need to build and operate to meet that need in the absence
of QFs; and (3) solicit offers to meet that need instead through non-utility
sources. The cost of the "avoided" utility-owned plant would be the
maximum price paid for non-utility power; if it was less expensive than the
bids received, the utility would be authorized to go forward and build it.
This "contestable markets" model of regulation was expected to improve
efficiency without sacrificing system reliability or rate stability. Selection
of winning bidders was based on criteria that included consideration of the
environmental impacts of generating technologies, however, in an attempt
to address the total social costs of technology choices.62
This distinction between ends (to be determined by regulators) and
means (to be delegated to markets) proved critical: California
policymakers still recognized the need to maintain centralized control over
system planning in order to ensure system reliability, but they also
recognized that markets are generally more efficient than regulators and
planners in determining the most cost-effective way to meet an identified
need. This distinction was subsequently lost when California restructured
the electricity market in the mid-1990s-leaving it to Adam Smith's
invisible hand to ensure system reliability. As we will see, it soon became
clear to generators and traders that reduced system reliability was in their
best economic interest.
C. Integrated Resource Planning: 1980s-1990s
Development of the California model was not unique to the state, but
was part of a national trend toward "least-cost planning" or "integrated
resource planning" that considered both supply- and demand-side
management alternatives as equally legitimate means of meeting projected
61 See Duane, supra note 49, at 218-19, for a brief history of these proposals. WILLIAMS,
supra note 34, offers a more comprehensive background on the relationship between energy policy and
the development of the state's complex economy but does not discuss the specific question of
electricity industry regulation or reform in any depth.
62 1 represented a coalition of renewable energy companies, energy efficiency companies,
and environmental groups in the proceedings before the CPUC in 1989 and 1990.
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future demand. Hirsh characterizes this trend as being driven by "the
growth of regulatory activism., 63 Regulators in Wisconsin, Nevada, and
several other states aggressively pursued direct comparisons of demand-
side and supply-side alternatives in utility resource plans. They also
explored explicit incorporation of the non-market social and environmental
costs of different generating technologies together with California, New
York, Massachussetts, and others.64 This approach attempted to work
within the existing institutional framework of the regulated investor-owned
utility while meeting projected needs through both regulatory approaches
(e.g., new appliance efficiency standards) and market means (e.g., non-
utility-owned QF generation).
Expanding use of the approach reflected the growing power of both
regulators and third parties (such as environmental groups and QFs),
which had not historically dominated utility planning or regulation. 6' The
dominance of utility managers was clearly at an ebb, and many of them
saw their traditional sources of profit growth being squeezed from both
sides: Demand-side reduction programs weakened sales growth, while
non-utility generation lessened opportunities to expand the investment rate
base on the generation side.66 Some investor-owned utilities were therefore
threatened by the new paradigm.
67
Regulators and environmentalists responded to this resistance by
trying to make the utilities whole in the face of conservation: By aligning
the utility's incentives with the new paradigm, it was hoped that utilities
would be enticed to invest in more conservation. California, therefore,
attempted to eliminate disincentives by creating new opportunities for
utilities to increase their profits through investments in conservation,
demand-side management, and efficiency.68 The increased emphases on
end-use efficiency and new technologies continued to erode profits for
suppliers and builders of traditional power plant equipment, however.
63 HIRSH, supra note 11, at 169-203 (title of chapter).
64 See THE ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF ELECTRICITY (Pace Univ. Ctr. for Envtl. Legal
Studies ed., 1990) for an overview of the analytic methods and estimates of economic costs.
65 Environmental groups successfully challenged declines in utility spending on
conservation and efficiency, for example, through several "collaborative" negotiations in New England
and California in the late-1980s. HIRSH, supra note 11, at 207-33.
66 In contrast, unregulated subsidiaries or affiliates of regulated utilities were expanding
rapidly to fill new markets. This led both PG&E and Edison to establish subsidiaries that threatened
further supply expansion by other utilities. Several of Edison's affiliates were also heavily invested in
California QFs, creating tensions at the CPUC regarding the risk of potential conflicts-of-interest.
These concerns proved well founded for all of the IOUs from 1996 to 2001.
67 The classic critique of utility regulation had been that it created incentives for
overinvestment by utilities, since all of their investments would earn a rate of return that probably
exceeded the true cost of capital. Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under
Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962).
68 HIRSH, supra note 11, at 207-33.
Vol. 19:471, 2002
Regulation's Rationale
Therefore, improved efficiency continued to threaten powerful vested
economic interests.69
Some industrial customers were also threatened by the new approach:
Just as rates had escalated to pay for both utility-owned investments in
nuclear power plants and long-run QF contracts, they were now being
asked to support investments to reduce other customers' energy bills
through expanded conservation programs. The prospect of leaving the grid
altogether to sign a deal with an unregulated generator became very
enticing. Self-generation was also an option, leading utility planners to
worry about a "death spiral" of ever-increasing rates as industrial
customers exited the system leaving only those who could not afford to
exit. 70 The result would be political fallout for state regulators and their
political patrons if residential (i.e., voting) ratepayers were left holding the
bag. Both the utilities and these industrial customers therefore sought to
constrain the implementation of expanded demand-side management
programs and expanded regulator power. In the face of an economic
downturn in the early-1990s, both state and federal leaders wanted to
address their concerns.
This is the critical moment in the evolution of electric utility
regulation. Just as an alternative paradigm-which involved both greater
power for regulators and greater attention to the social and environmental
consequences of the electric utility system-was ascending to replace the
"utility consensus," it was eclipsed by another paradigm that abandoned
both the role of the regulators and their attention to social and
environmental concerns. Hirsh gives a blow-by-blow account of the debate
among the power elite about this question, but he does not adequately
answer the central question in light of the California disaster: Why and
how did the advocates of deregulation defeat the advocates of integrated
resource planning? Equally important, how could such a fundamental
change in such an essential role for the state have occurred with so little
public involvement or attention to the drastic consequences that would
ultimately fall on the broader public?
There are no easy answers to these questions. The apparent success of
deregulation in other industries (such as airlines, telecommunications,
69 Because many of these same interests saw rapid expansion in markets for non-utility
power, these interests had an interest in promoting further deregulation. In particular, Wall Street saw
new opportunities, through deregulation, to finance new non-utility projects, restructure existing
utilities into separate corporate entities, and to handle mergers and acquisitions as the industry
restructured. Wall Street therefore generally supported the deregulation project.
70 This concern replicates one of the original rationales for regulation of the industry: To
ensure universal access to service, regulators had historically adopted rate schedules with cross-class
subsidies from larger industrial users to smaller residential users. Remote rural users were also often
subsidized, and the federal government's commitment to rural electrification reflected equity concerns
rather than only economic efficiency concerns. Such subsidies were out of political favor by the late-
1980s, however, as efficiency became the dominant value in regulatory debates.
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natural gas, trucking) clearly served as a model for deregulation advocates
in the electricity sector.71 This success certainly played a central rhetorical
role in much of the debate among policymakers (who were heavily
influenced by the increasing dominance of the economic analysis of
regulation).72 The analogies should have had their limitations, however,
due to some of the technological characteristics of electricity. In particular,'
the need to match supply and demand instantaneously and simultaneously
throughout the entire grid (within very narrow frequency and voltage
tolerances) meant that all demand must be met fully at all times. David
Marcus has said that it would be comparable to having a deregulated
airline system where, any time a flight was delayed for a single minute,
every other airplane flying at the time of the delay would simultaneously
drop out of the sky.73 Clearly, electricity had different technological,
economic, and historical characteristics than air transportation and needed
to be handled differently. 4
Among the policy elites, however, these distinctions were not
dominant. The rhetoric -and discourse of regulatory reform, therefore,
continued to focus on economic challenges to the natural monopoly
argument and the virtues of presumptive improvements in economic
efficiency under a deregulated market. Other rationales for regulation were
largely ignored, although the distributive consequences of deregulation
had important political ramifications. William Golove, who has studied the
rhetoric of the California deregulation and restructuring debate, lost track
when he counted the word "efficiency" being used more than 100 times in
71 The broader push to deregulate American industries gained strength with the arrival of
the Reagan Administration in 1981. Serious political interest in reform led to a series of studies in the
early 1980s, including a book by current U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen G. Breyer. STEPHEN G.
BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982). Breyer previously published a study through the
Brookings Institution. STEPHEN G. BREYER & PAUL W. MACAVOY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE
FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION (1974). FERC conducted an investigation into deregulation of
wholesale power markets in the Reagan Administration, and the definitive book on the topic (for the
time) was published in 1983 by Paul L. Joskow and Richard Schmalensee. PAUL L. JOSKOW &
RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY DEREGULATION
(1983).
72 Perhaps most notable among the influences in this area was ALFRED E. KAHN, THE
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS (2 vols., 1970-1971). For a profile of
Kahn's influence during "the Economist's Hour," see THOMAS K. MCCRAw, PROPHETS OF
REGULATION: CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, JAMES M. LANDIS, ALFRED E. KAHN
222-29 (1984).
73 David Marcus, Remarks before the California Public Utilities Commission, Proceeding
OIl 00-08-02, San Diego, Cal. (Aug. 23, 2000). These characteristics present unique opportunities to
exercise market power.
74 Analysts like Joskow and Schmalensee recognized these differences, but the subtleties of
their analysis were not part of the broader political rhetoric among elected policymakers. See JOSKOW
& SCHMALENSEE, supra note 71, at ix ("We found that key technical, economic, and institutional
features of the electric power industry had not been adequately considered in much of the writing on
deregulation."). To many politicians, electricity was just another market that suffered from too much




a ninety minute meeting of "stakeholders" discussing California's
deregulation scheme. He also saw the initial technical discussions of
"wheeling" give way to "direct access" and finally "customer choice."
Like "wheeling," the term "deregulation" also generated a cool response to
proposals for policy change. Further discussion of "deregulation" was
therefore abandoned in favor of "restructuring"-a more neutral and
euphemistic term that did not imply the kind of fundamental change in the
relationship between markets and regulators that was, in fact, being
considered. Although some participants (e.g., environmentalists) claimed
that they did not care about rhetoric, it appears that others (e.g., utilities)
convened focus groups and carefully tested the salience of particular
terms. "Efficiency" and "restructuring," therefore, became the buzz words
that dominated the discourse for all participants v5
Finally, the broader cultural milieu in which the electric utility
"restructuring" debate occurred also played a critical role. The early- 1 990s
were "the age of market triumphalism," as the Berlin Wall collapsed and
the Soviet Union soon followed.76 Put simply, markets were the answer,
government was the problem, and anybody who thought otherwise was
either Rip Van Winkle or a card-carrying liberal clinging to the past.
Shouldn't we "free" the "captive customers" of the utilities by
"unleashing" the "creative energy of the marketplace?"
It is not coincidental, however, that this rhetoric of "efficient
markets" and "inefficient regulation" supports institutional arrangements
that tend to increase political power and economic wealth for some
interests while decreasing both for others. The benefits of such a shift in
discourse and policy are likely to be high for a narrow set of players, while
75 William Golove, Presentation to the Energy and Resources Group Colloquium,
University of California, Berkeley (Feb. 20, 2002) (on file with author); Interview with William
Golove (Mar. 8, 2002) (on file with author) (Golove is a researcher at the Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory and his research will be published in his Ph.D. dissertation in late 2002).
76 The phrase "the age of market triumphalism" was coined by Michael Watts. Michael
Watts, Liberation Ecology: Development, Sustainability, and Environment in an Age of Market
Triumphalism, in LIBERATION ECOLOGIES: ENVIRONMENT, DEVELOPMENT, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
(Richard Peet & Michael Watts eds., 1996). The groundwork for this assault on the usefulness of
government regulation was initially laid when Jimmy Carter was elected President in 1976 with an
anti-Washington "outsider" campaign. Carter, who first ran for elected office in Georgia with promises
to improve government efficiency and to shake up the state bureaucracy, was also the last President to
oversee a regulatory apparatus with any significant political support for tough regulation. Ronald
Reagan gutted regulatory agencies' budgets and morale, while George Bush and Bill Clinton pursued
market-oriented policies while still acknowledging a role for regulators. Four of the past five
Presidents (Carter, Reagan, Clinton, and [George W. Bush) ran as "outside-the-Beltway" governors
who had administrative experience to run government more efficiently. The result is a regulatory
system that must increasingly rely upon private litigation to achieve public policy goals. For an
example in auto safety regulation, see Michael Winerip, Can One Obsessed Lawyer Use These Tires to
Pin the Rollover Crisis on Ford?: The Explorer on Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2000, § 6 (Magazine),
at 46. A similar scenario is now driving shareholder interests in the Enron and PG&E bankruptcies,
both of which involved transactions that should have been more closely scrutinized by federal
regulators at both the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and the FERC.
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the costs or risks of such a shift are likely to be both broadly borne and
smaller for each party harmed (although potentially much larger, as
demonstrated in the California case, in the aggregate). This arrangement
fits a classic "client" model for legislative action: With concentrated
benefits and distributed costs (although they were characterized as
distributed benefits), legislation for change "[t]ends to have strong interest
group support and weak, if any, organized opposition.",77 Moreover,
"[b]ecause the costs can be allocated to an uninformed public, [the]
legislature will follow a policy of distribution of subsidies and power to
the organized beneficiaries. Often, self-regulation is the chosen policy. 7 8
Not surprisingly, then, the public was ill-informed, and elites dominated
the process.
Due to this concentration of benefits to "clients" under deregulation,
the pervasive and potentially corrupting influence of money in the political
process likely played an important role in the story of how deregulation
and restructuring became a dominant mantra for a chorus of policy
analysts and decision-makers from both political parties. The specific
relationship between campaign finance and policy-making in this arena
therefore needs further research. In general, though, a few things are clear:
Those interests who would benefit from deregulation and restructuring
clearly found it worthwhile to invest in the political campaigns of (and
"educational" programs for) key decision-makers. In contrast, the tens of
millions of people who would be harmed from such a massive structural
change had to rely on underfunded proxies through consumer and
environmental organizations. The latter were hopelessly outfunded in this
debate, and they largely viewed the move to deregulation as a fait
accompli. Although their participation in the so-called "collaborative"
processes that generated particular deregulatory schemes gave those
processes some greater political legitimacy, the asymmetrical power
relationships among the stakeholders cannot be ignored. Opponents often
felt they either had to negotiate the terms of deregulation in order to
mitigate its impacts or else see adoption of a full-blown version of
deregulation even more harmful to their interests.
79
But nobody was paying much attention to the question of who gave
what to whom when the deregulation turn took hold in American
electricity regulatory policy-making. Instead, both the elites and the
broader public were willing to accept the basic premise that less
77 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 57 (3d ed. 2001).
78 Id. at 59 (emphasis in original).
79 See Timothy P. Duane, Community Participation in Ecosystem Management, 4 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 771 (1997), for a discussion of the risks of relying on "collaborative" or "consensus-based"





government oversight was generally a good thing for both producers and
consumers. In the words of Patrick Wood III, Chairman of FERC,
"Deregulation always benefits people. If it doesn't, you've got to rework it
until it does."80
II. Revolutionary Deregulation: Self-Interest and Visions of the Invisible
Hand
A. Deregulation and Restructuring: 1990s-?
And so it was with such faith that the policy elites (or at least those
steering the ship of policy debate) abandoned both the historic utility
consensus and the emerging alternative paradigm of integrated resource
planning. Simplistic popular assumptions ("deregulation always benefits
people") displaced complex technical analysis ("under certain
circumstances, the technical characteristics of electricity markets allow
firms to exercise market power to increase prices and decrease reliability")
as both regulators and legislators entered the deregulation and
restructuring fray. California adopted a particular form of restructuring in
the 1990s that involved both some fundamental design flaws and some
terrible timing, but the cultural conditions for its adoption were not
fundamentally different than those that continue to permeate national
political discourse today. If anything, from 1975 to 1995 California had
accomplished more to move towards a viable model of integrated resource
planning than anyplace else in the world. The problem, therefore, lies as
much in the national political culture as in the specifics of California's ill-
fated experiment.81 Other states may have smirked when the crisis hit the
Golden State, but they will not be laughing when it hits them.
80 Zachary Coile & Bernadette Tansey, Bush Appointee Warns State PUC on "Direct
Access", S.F. CHRON., Jun. 28, 2001, at A]. Wood became chairman of FERC on September 1, 2001.
He nevertheless appears to be much more willing than his two predecessors (Republican Curt Herbert,
Jr., and Democrat James J. Hoecker) to consider a legitimate role for regulation of energy markets.
Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, FERC ChiefAims to Bolster Free Market Faith, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2001,
at A29. His appointment appears to be directly tied to influence by Enron. Therefore, his fate at FERC
may hinge on the outcome of investigations into Enron's ties to the Bush Administration. Deposed
FERC Chair Herbert claims that Enron chair Kenneth Lay suggested to him that Hebert's future tenure
as FERC Chair would depend upon his support for Enron's proposals to deregulate the electricity
industry. Lay has denied Hebert's claim, but Hebert was replaced by Wood shortly after Hebert made
his claim about Enron's pressure public. See Frontline: Blackout (PBS television broadcast, June 12,
2001).
81 In this sense, both Democrats and Republicans created the conditions for the California
crisis. AB 1890 was unanimously supported by legislators from both parties in both houses in 1996,
and it was implemented by a Democratic majority at FERC and a Republican majority at the CPUC
through 2000. Assemb. B. 1890, 1995-1996 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996). Coincidentally, Republicans
gained control of FERC shortly after Democrats became the CPUC's majority in January 2001. The
underlying causes of the California crisis are therefore neither political party's exclusive responsibility.
Yale Journal on Regulation
In fact, there is some evidence that other states are already finding
themselves in similar market conditions. The Pennsylvania-New Jersey-
Maryland ("PJM") Interconnection saw daily Capacity Credit prices jump
from less than $1 per megawatt-day in late-2000 to approximately $177
per megawatt-day on January 1, 2001. This jump led PJM to request
changes to a methodology contained in its FERC tariffs as the
Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate raised alarms about a
significant coincident decrease in the amount of physical capacity being
bid into that market.12 Pennsylvania has been widely cited as a "success"
story in deregulation and restructuring, but some retail providers pulled out
of the Pennsylvania market in 2001 due to these dramatic changes.83 Even
Texas, which is exempt from FERC oversight of its isolated grid, saw
standby power prices jump from about $45 per MWh to approximately
$1000 per MWh on the first day of its new power market. 84 New York and
New England also experienced dramatic spikes in wholesale market prices
and rolling blackouts during critical periods in 2000 and 2001.85 It is
unclear in all of these states how well their systems will weather the boom-
and-bust cycles of robust demand growth followed by recessionary
periods. One thing is clear: Every functional electricity market in the world
has abundant excess capacity (creating the conditions for competitive
behavior by generators and traders), strict regulatory oversight (through
either centralized dispatch authority or windfall profits taxes) that
discourages the exercise of market power, or (preferably) both.86
For all of its apparent ascendancy in a few states in the late-1980s and
early-1990s, therefore, the integrated resource planning paradigm was
defeated primarily at the federal level by the deregulation and restructuring
paradigm. FERC took a direct swipe at California's efforts when it rejected
the CPUC's requirement that California's investor-owned utilities meet
projected long-term demand through contracts with non-utility generators
82 John Hanger et al., Storm Warning, 3 PENN FUTURE No. 4 (Citizens for Pa.'s Future,
Harrisburg, Pa.), Feb. 20, 2001.
83 The PJM market maintains strict dispatch authority over generators and it evolved from a
tightly-linked interconnection where the vast majority of generating capacity is still owned by utilities.
Moreover, Pennsylvania focused on establishing a competitive retail market by subsidizing consumers
to switch electricity providers. The resulting system appears more successful from the standpoint of
"customer choice," but it is unclear if the market is functioning competitively or if customers are
actually benefiting under the new system compared to the old system.
84 Dale Kasler, Texas Power Deregulation Gets Off to California Start, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Aug. 3, 2001, at A25.
85 Neela Banerjee & Richard Perez-Pena, A Failed Energy Plan Catches Up to New York,
N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 1, 2001, at Al; Peter Howe, After Reprimand, Another Power Failure After Talks,
Power Failure, BOST. GLOBE, Aug. 24, 2001, at Pt.
86 The England-Wales market, which has been operating longer than any of the American
markets, saw widespread market power abuses in the early years which were only reined in after
imposition of a windfall profits tax. Similar abuses have recently been seen in Australia. In contrast,
most European countries have adopted a more moderate form of electricity market restructuring that
still retains centralized dispatch authority and greater regulation.
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who had won the first BRPU bidding competition. Edison and SDGandE
argued both that the power would not be needed in the late-i 990s and that
the contracted price was excessive due to the CPUC's willingness to
require utilities to pay slightly more for less environmentally-damaging
sources of generation.87 Although pundits later blamed California
regulators for not ensuring enough new generating capacity a decade later,
it was FERC and the utilities themselves who had stopped the CPUC in the
early-1990s from ensuring adequate reserves. Their action delayed
additions to the California grid that had been correctly identified by the
BRPU process as necessary to be operational by 2000-200 1.8
Congress also poured cold water on the integrated resource planning
party with passage of the Energy Policy Act of 1992.89 The Act created a
new class of exempt wholesale generators that would now be exempt (like
QFs under PURPA) from some provisions of the Public Utilities Holding
Company Act of 1935. It also encouraged FERC to promote "wholesale
wheeling" through interstate transmission systems under its oversight.
Many utilities and their executives objected to both provisions. Because of
their objections, expressed in a newspaper advertisement arguing that the
Act would lead to "a savings-and-loan disaster in the electric utility
industry," deregulation proponents referred to them as the "Just Say No"
crowd.9 ° "The only ones who will benefit are the independent power
producers and their select customers," said Philadelphia Electric
Company's CEO, Joseph Paquette. "Outside of this small group, everyone
else stands to lose through higher costs and less reliable service."9' These
pleas were ignored as Congress passed the Act with strong support from
87 The utilities based much of their argument on the apparent availability of abundant
"excess" power on the spot market throughout the western grid, which meant that power could be
purchased in the short term at roughly the operating cost of existing facilities. Not surprisingly, that
was well below the long-term cost of providing new supply-which required both utilities and QFs to
recover capital costs as well as operating costs. Eric Nalder & Mark Gladstone, U.S. Agency's Actions
Invited California Power Disaster, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 3, 2001, at IA.
88 See Nalder & Gladstone, supra note 87; Judy Pasternak & Alan C. Miller, Watchdogs
Take a Hit in State's Power Ills, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 2001, at AI.
89 Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776; see also Jeffrey D. Watkiss & Douglas W. Smith,
The Energy Policy Act of 1992-A Watershed for Competition in the Wholesale Power Market, 10
YALE J. ON REG. 447 (1993).
90 Electric Reliability Coalition, Advertisement, HART. COURANT, Sept. 12, 1991, at C13,
reprinted in HIRSH, supra note 11, at 246. Although public choice theorists would emphasize the self-
interest of such opposition (arguing that resistant utilities wanted to maintain their cushy relationships
with regulators rather than face more efficient competitors), the electric utility industry has historically
attracted employees who value the notion of public service as part of their company's and industry's
heritage. Opponents did not say "we'll lose while others will win," but that only a small group would
benefit from the change. This is the same position that consumer groups took when faced with specific
deregulation proposals in California.
91 Joseph Paquette, Commentary, PUHCA Proposal Could Harm Millions, ENERGY DAILY,
Feb. 14, 1992, at 4; HIRSH, supra note 11, at 245.
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the first Bush Administration.92 Paquette proved quite prescient, yet his
arguments were given little weight in 1992.
B. "Restructuring" in California.- 1992-1996
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 set the national stage for deregulation
and restructuring, but how did it go so terribly wrong in California? Why
did the state become a badly injured victim of its encounter rather than the
poster child for entrepreneurial innovation that otherwise characterizes the
state? Perhaps most importantly, how well have policymakers responded
to the crisis, and what are the lessons we can learn from the California
case?
The specific form of the California experiment had two parents: the
CPUC, which initiated deregulation and restructuring efforts from 1992 to
1995, and the state legislature, which intervened to modify the CPUC's
approach by adopting a negotiated package of legislation in 1996. The
CPUC proposals were first initiated by CPUC President Daniel Fessler in
1992, distributed for discussion in a staff report (the "Yellow Book") in
1993, and then released in more detail in 1994 in a policy statement (the
"Blue Book").9 3 The CPUC's initiative generated considerable debate at
both the CPUC and the Legislature for the following year, but even the
CPUC could not agree on a single approach when it issued a preliminary
proposal for restructuring in 1995.94 Key legislators then stepped into the
debate in 1996 to develop a compromise plan through marathon closed-
door negotiating sessions among the major stakeholders.
Participants called the sessions "The Steve Peace Death March," after
San Diego area Assembly member Steve Peace, who had produced the
film Attack of the Killer Tomatoes before being elected to the
Legislature. 95 Peace, who moved up to the California State Senate in 1998,
was widely trusted by fellow legislators due to his sharp intellect and his
92 The chairman of the Republican National Convention during George Bush (senior)'s re-
election campaign in 1992 was Kenneth Lay, the chairman of Enron Corporation. Enron played a
prominent role in the deregulation and restructuring debate both in its early development generally and
in the California crisis specifically. Lay argued that the fundamental flaw in California's system is that
it did not go far enough to deregulate. Although Lay's approach was not ultimately adopted in the
Bush Administration's National Energy Plan in 2001, Lay may have had considerable influence over
how FERC handled the California crisis. Lay certainly played an influential role in how the President
formed his views on electricity markets and deregulation of the industry when Bush was governor of
Texas.
93 HIRSH, supra note 11, at 248-59.
94 Id. at 257.
95 Forum (KQED-FM 88.5 radio broadcast, Aug. 24, 2001). Peace was widely credited with
being the father of AB 1890 until summer 2000, when he and fellow Democrats pointed the finger of
blame at former Republican Governor Pete Wilson and Republican Minority Leader Jim Brulte.





willingness to tackle thorny, complex problems like electricity
deregulation and restructuring. Fellow legislators, therefore, generally
trusted that AB 1890 was good legislation when most of the key
stakeholders agreed to it. Consumer groups and environmental groups
were reluctant participants, however, who realized early on in the debate
that deregulation and restructuring were going to occur whether they
participated or not. Their participation, therefore, reflected an attempt to
mitigate the harms of deregulation rather than an enthusiastic embrace of
it. The AB 1890 negotiations highlight how important asymmetrical power
96
relationships are in so-called "consensus"-based processes. By trying to
offer something for everybody, AB 1890 was really a political
compromise rather than an analytically-driven piece of legislation that
reflected the technical complexities of the industry and the industry's
regulatory history. "We're not equipped to do that," reflected Assembly
Utilities Committee Chair Roderick Wright in 2001. "We should have
been making overall policy and getting out" to let the CPUC manage the
details of restructuring. A longtime lobbyist went much further, saying that
"legislators are institutionally, congenitally, totally incapable of handling
details of something as complicated as electrical energy." 9' This is not
inherently true, but it may be effectively true today in an era of term limits,
high turnover, and limited staff experience or expertise.
In the end, AB 1890 passed by a unanimous vote of both houses of
the Legislature on the last day of the 1996 legislative session. It is doubtful
that many legislators understood many of the details of the bill, but
Governor Pete Wilson signed AB 1890 into law on September 23, 1996.98
In keeping with the market zeitgeist of the time, he proudly pointed to the
California legislation as another successful example of a market-oriented
approach breathing new life into a stale, regulated industry that suffered
from too much "command-and-control" oversight. "We've pulled the plug
on another outdated monopoly," proclaimed Wilson, "and replaced it with
the promise of a new era of competition." 99
C. Flaws in the AB 1890 Market Structure: 1996-2000
Several key features of the California system helped to spawn the
2000-2001 crisis. In particular, concerns about vertical market power (the
ability of the investor-owned utilities to gain an advantage over either
wholesale or retail competitors by entering into special deals that
96 See Duane, supra note 79.
97 George Skelton, Complexity of Energy Problem Was Too Much for Legislators, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2001, at B6.
98 Assemb. B. 1890, 1995-1996 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996).
99 HRSH, supra note 11, at 259.
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otherwise would not be available to their competitors) were paramount.100
These concerns led to a market design that required all purchases and sales
to go through a single "transparent" market, called the California Power
Exchange ("PX"). The logic of this requirement was simple: As long as
the utilities had to buy power through a transparent market (where prices
would be posted and other market participants would be paid the same
price), the utilities would not be able to exercise market power as either a
producer (monopoly power) or consumer (monopsony power). AB 1890,
therefore, established two new, independent bodies to run the California
system: (1) the PX, and (2) the Independent System Operator ("ISO"). The
PX was intended to deal with market transactions, while the ISO was
intended only to ensure transmission system integrity by running the
transmission system for the utilities (which continued to own the
transmission system itself). The theory was that power generation, which
ostensibly no longer had natural monopoly characteristics, would be
separated from transmission, which still had natural monopoly
characteristics.'0 ' In this way, California could gain the benefits of
competition in the generation sector while still protecting against
monopoly abuses in the transmission sector.
Unfortunately, both the PX and ISO were designed in ways that failed
to address the underlying technology and economics of electricity. The PX
was structured primarily as a day-ahead market, where buyers and sellers
would submit bid curves (indicating how much power they would be
willing to buy or sell at a series of prices) just one day ahead of the
delivery of the power. In theory, this allowed bids to reflect reliable
demand forecasts, which are driven in California primarily by weather
conditions. In practice, however, relying on a day-ahead structure
increased uncertainty for both buyers and sellers. The PX attempted to
remedy this by offering some "forward" contracts, but these were
generally constrained by requiring buyers and sellers to follow standard
"block" structures in terms of when the power would be delivered.
Forward contracts might be available for all peak hours during weekdays,
for example, but some buyers and sellers might only want to enter into
forward contracts for a subset of those hours. Standardization of the PX
forward contracts prevented such buyers and sellers from entering into
what would presumably be mutually advantageous contracts. The investor-
owned utilities were required to buy all of their power through the PX, so
100 This concern derived directly from Edison's historic relation to its unregulated affiliates,
who already had a strong presence in the California QF market. PG&E's parent corporation was also
aggressively expanding its unregulated operations in other states, and SDGandE had a relationship
with Southern California Gas Company (through their parent corporation, Sempra Energy) that
presented potential conflicts for independent generators in southern California.
101 See JOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 71.
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they could not negotiate non-standard bilateral contracts with prospective
sellers.
Sellers soon learned how to use this constraint to their advantage. In
particular, sellers realized that the ISO would pay higher prices than the
utilities would pay in the PX if there was a desperate need to buy more
power to keep the transmission grid operating. Therefore, on days when
forecast weather was likely to require all of the power available from
sellers, there was little risk for sellers either not to participate in the PX
day-ahead market or to demand extremely high prices for their power.
They knew that the ISO would call them up the next day and offer a higher
price: The integrity and stability of the entire grid would then depend on
getting that power into the system. Sellers, therefore, migrated from the
PX day-ahead market to the ISO real-time market whenever it appeared
that the ISO would need to buy power at the last minute the next day. This
migration, in turn, decreased the amount of power being offered through
the PX and increased the likelihood that the ISO would have to buy a lot of
power under extremely urgent conditions. The ISO then found itself
functioning as a market rather than only a transmission system manager.
Unlike the PX, however, the ISO had to buy power for delivery for the
same day or even the next hour. This gave sellers almost infinite market
power.
This market structure resulted in two major problems: It seriously
limited long-term contracts, and it was especially subject to gaming and
market manipulation. The AB 1890 structure resulted in 80% to 85% of all
transactions going through either the PX or the ISO daily "spot" market,
while other electricity markets in the world operate with 80% to 85% of all
transactions through long-term forward contracts. 10 2 Long-term forward
contracts allow generators to finance their projects on more favorable
terms due to the increased certainty over their revenue stream. Such
contracts also offer greater price stability for buyers.' °3
Under the PX system, sellers were also paid a market-clearing price
("MCP") equal to the price paid to the highest successful bid for a given
102 Frank Wolak, Identification and Estimation of Cost Functions Using Observed Bid Data:
An Application to Electricity Markets, Presentation at the University of California Energy Institute
P.O.W.E.R. Conference, Berkeley, Cal. (Mar. 16, 2001), (a recent draft is available at
ftp://zia.stanford.edu/pub/papers/seattle.feb.pdf).
103 Ironically, this same rationale led the CPUC to develop the long-run QF contracts in 1983
and the BRPU process in the late 1980s. Long-term investments require long-term commitments, or
else the operators of the projects will try to recover all of their costs quickly whenever they have an
opportunity to do so in times of shortages. Long-run average costs should generally be lower with
reduced uncertainty because a steady stream of income for long-lived assets allows project developers
to acquire lower-cost financing. This is why the QF contracts of the 1980s offered cogeneration
projects a bifurcated payment: A fixed "capacity" payment covered capital costs, and a variable
"energy" payment was tied to the variable cost of natural gas. In contrast, high fixed-cost renewable
energy projects (e.g., wind, solar, geothermal, small hydro) received a single fixed payment for the
first ten years.
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period rather than their actual bid price. The economic theory underlying
this design was that sellers would competitively bid their marginal
operating costs to ensure some sales, and then recover their fixed costs
through payments in excess of their own operating costs. Demand for 100
MW of power, for example, could be met through bids by four sellers
offering 25 MW each at 4, 6, 8, and 10 cents per kwh, respectively. All
100 MW would be paid 10 cents per kwh under the PX system, allowing
the first three bidders to earn revenue that would go towards repayment of
their fixed costs. The fourth bidder would still find it advantageous to
operate, because its payment covered its operating costs, and it would earn
some revenue toward its fixed costs if higher demand (say, for 125 MW of
power) resulted in another bidder (say, at 12 cents per kwh) being selected
(thereby establishing an MCP of 12 cents per kwh). Due to the lack of
forward contracting opportunities, however, sellers had to get whatever
they could from short-term transactions without any guaranteed payment
on subsequent days toward their fixed costs. Not surprisingly, such
enormous uncertainty led sellers generally to bid prices into the PX that
were higher than their true marginal operating costs. Moreover, they
quickly learned that all successful sellers benefited any time a more
expensive resource was the last bidder selected (thereby establishing a
higher MCP). This was especially likely to occur if the ISO was making
real-time purchases. The PX-only requirement for market transactions,
combined with the availability of the ISO real-time market and a system
that paid all bidders an MCP equal to the highest successful bid, therefore,
meant that it was only a daily or hourly risk for sellers in the California
system to exercise market power in either one of two ways: (1) by
withholding power from the market physically until scarcity developed, or
(2) by demanding extremely high prices when scarcity was likely. This
risk diminished even more if their competitors did not respond by
undercutting bids in excess of marginal production costs. Buyers could
gain from last-minute competition whenever there was surplus power in
the market, but sellers were in the driver's seat under conditions of
scarcity.
Texas Senator Dave Sibley came to California after the market
opened in 1998 to see how the California market worked, and he later said:
[W]hat we learned is what we didn't want to do.... It took us about 15
minutes drawing on a napkin sitting in the back of an airplane to figure
out how to game it. If I can do that, then you can figure a whole lot
smarter people than I can figure it out.
104
104 Robert Salladay, California Shivers-Texas Smirks; Lone Star State Enjoying Our
Predicament, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 20, 2001, at A].
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Not surprisingly, many apparently did just that.
D. Paying Off Existing Utility Power Plants.: 1996-2000
The California system also carried the burden of trying to recover the
so-called "stranded costs" of past investments by the investor-owned
utilities. These were costs associated with long-term commitments the
utilities had made during the cost-of-service regulatory regime that were
not expected to be cost-effective in a competitive market. The IOUs
simply would not sign off on any legislative package that did not allow
them accelerated recovery for these "sunk" costs.'0 5 The political solution
adopted by the Legislature appeared fairly simple on its face: During a
four-year transition period from 1998 to 2002, the utilities Would be
allowed to collect more revenue from ratepayers than was necessary to
provide the power demanded by their customers. However, consumer
advocates demanded some immediate benefit from AB 1890. Therefore,
the negotiated settlement included provisions to freeze residential and
small commercial customers' rates at a level 10% below that which existed
when AB 1890 was implemented. This frozen level (which was actually
only 2% lower, since customers had to pay a surcharge to repay the bonds
used to establish the cut) was still believed to be well in excess of
whatever the utilities would have to pay for power, allowing them enough
headroom to pay off between $20 and $30 billion of so-called stranded
costs. Rates were then expected to drop once the transition period ended in
April 2002.106
The widely-cited rate cap in the California system was therefore
actually intended to be a rate floor rather than a cap-it was designed to
ensure that rates would never drop below a level adequate to allow the
utilities to collect more than they needed to pay for both current power
needs during the transition period in order to pay off past investments or
commitments that were expected to be uneconomic in a competitive
market. Critics of the California system have often cited their Economics
101 texts to remind everybody how government-imposed rate caps always
lead to shortages, but California never imposed a rate cap on the California
utilities. Instead, the state went along with utility demands for a rate
freeze, which acted as a rate floor, and allowed the utilities to transfer
105 Making the utilities whole for such investments has been challenged as unnecessary,
however, in the transition to a deregulated or restructured market. See generally Lois R. Lupica,
Transition Losses in the Electric Power Market: A Challenge to the Premises Underlying the
Arguments for Compensation, 52 RUTGERS L. REv. 649 (2000).
106 Full-scale retail competition would also be introduced for all customers and the rate
freeze would end earlier if a utility's "stranded costs" were paid off before April 2002.
Yale Journal on Regulation
billions of dollars to their parent corporations and affiliates from April
1998 to April 2000.07 It was never the primary cause of any apparent
shortages in the California system, and it was a system that former
Governor Wilson said the utilities themselves had "eagerly requested at the
time of enactment" of AB 1890.'0' This is why the CPUC and state
legislators resisted utilities' calls to end the rate freeze in 2000 and 2001:
The utilities had gained the benefit of the arrangement for two years but
now wanted to impose the burden of the deal only on ratepayers. 10 9 Neither
the utilities nor the legislators had adequately considered the possibility
that wholesale prices might actually go up instead of down. Consequently,
the structure imposed by AB 1890 had no safety valve provision to allow
utilities to recover costs higher than the frozen level." 0
Non-utility retail providers were also obligated to pay a "Competitive
Transition Charge" ("CTC") toward the utilities' "stranded costs." This
surcharge overhang made it difficult for new retail competitors to siphon
utility customers away based on cost advantages. Customers were allowed
to shop around and change providers, but there was very little incentive to
do so or for competitors to enter the California retail market during the
transition period. Moreover, the California utilities still faced the prospect
of being undercut by competitors as soon as the transition period ended,
which created another disincentive for them to enter into long-term
forward contracts for customers that they might not be able to retain. In
fact, none of the California utilities took full advantage of even the limited
107 The utilities transferred so much to their parents and affiliates during this period above
their cost of providing power to retail customers that they remained net winners under AB 1890
through December 2000. Neither PG&E nor Edison has been buying power on behalf of their
customers since the state DWR took over purchases in January 2001, so they have both probably
collected more through the frozen rates than they lost due to the rate freeze. The state Attorney General
has sued PG&E to recover $4.6 billion of this money, claiming that the utility and its parent
corporation engaged in unfair business practices during this period. Claire Cooper & Carrie Peyton,
State Files Fraud Suit Against PG&E Parent, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 11, 2002,
http://www.sacbee.com/content/politics/story/14461 4 9 p-1522628c.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2002).
108 Pete Wilson, Commentary, Deregulation Not to Blame But Davis Is: His Inaction
Allowed a Problem to Become a Power, and Fiscal, Crisis, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 3, 2001, available
at http://www.sacbee.com/static/archive/news/special/power/060301 wilson.html.
109 Unlike PG&E and Edison, SDGandE managed to pay off all of its "stranded costs" by
May 2000. SDGandE customers were therefore fully exposed to wholesale market prices when they
shot through the roof in summer 2000. PG&E and Edison customers were insulated by the rate freeze,
which meant that customers paid less each month than the utilities spent buying power on their behalf.
This arrangement was reinstituted for SDGandE customers through the establishment of a new
"balancing account" with passage of AB 265 in August 2000, see Assemb. B. 265, 1999-2000 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000), but the state legislature adjourned without addressing the underlying structural
problems in the California market.
110 This oversight highlights how the widely-accepted belief that "deregulation always
benefits people" substituted for critical analysis in the move toward deregulation and restructuring in
California. The CPUC's own Division of Ratepayer Advocates had warned that prices would go up
soon as continuing demand growth eliminated the "excess" capacity of the early-1990s, but these
claims were dismissed by the ideologically-driven Commissioners.
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authority the CPUC gave them to enter into such contracts."1 ' The utilities
thought they faced less risk by buying power primarily through the spot
market.
That belief proved to be well-founded during the first two years of the
California experiment. Both California and the rest of the West were
seriously overbuilt in the late-1980s, and that so-called excess capacity
meant extremely low-cost power on the wholesale spot market. 112 Large
capital-intensive coal and nuclear plants had low operating costs, while
new gas-fired projects were very efficient. The national recession of the
early-1990s stretched the surplus of the late-1980s into the mid-1990s.
Unusually favorable hydroelectric conditions in the Pacific Northwest also
flooded the market with cheap hydropower from 1996 to 1999. Spot
market prices averaged anywhere from $20 to $40 per MWh from April
1998 to April 2000, allowing plenty of headroom for recovery of stranded
costs.
Existing utility-owned power plants were also viewed as nearly
obsolete due to their age and high operating costs in this low-cost
operating environment. AB 1890 required the utilities to sell off half of
their oil- and gas-fired facilities, but the utilities went further (with CPUC
encouragement) and sold off nearly their entire fossil-fired generation
systems. All told, the utilities sold 18,348 MW of generation with a book
value of $1.76 billion for $3.33 billion.' 13 This represented one-third of the
Ill From August 1999 to September 2000, the investor-owned utilities used the following
percentages of the PX block forward market energy procurement authorized by the CPUC: Edison
(59%), PG&E (33%), and SDGandE (2%). Prepared Direct Testimony of Paul Clanon and
Accompanying Exhibits, Exhibit PUC-12 at 39-41, Exhibit PUC at 31-38, San Diego Gas & Elec. Co.,
93 F.E.R.C. 61,294 (2000) (order directing remedies). However, the Legislature also restricted
bilateral long-term contracting by the utilities in 2000 until FERC effectively imposed such a
requirement on the state in its November 1, 2000 draft order. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 93
F.E.R.C. 61,121 (2000) (order proposing remedies). It is clear that long-term forward contracts
would have diminished excessive dependence on the volatile spot market, but it is not clear that the
failure to acquire those contracts was primarily due to the CPUC's "refusal" to allow the utilities to
enter into them. The basic position of the CPUC was that the utilities could do so, but the contracts
would then face "reasonableness review" before the contract costs could be passed through to their
customers. The utilities then decided they were unwilling to risk such CPUC review given the
uncertainty in the wholesale power market.
112 Both the nation as a whole, and California in particular, may soon find themselves in this
condition again. Neela Banerjee, As Prices Fall, Utilities Weigh the Economics of New Plants, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 22, 2001, at Cl. There are also strong disincentives to build new projects if builders
believe they will be able to exercise market power with facilities they already own and operate in a
given market. Either effective regulation or contract provisions that ensure reliable performance are
therefore essential to ensure adequate fulfillment of commitments to build new generation to meet
projected demand.
113 PG&E sold 6,825 MW of facilities with a book value of $1.035 billion for $1.653 billion,
Edison sold 9,612 MW of facilities with a book value of $529 million for $1.187 billion, and
SDGandE sold 1,911 MW of generation with a book value of $195 million for $486 million. PG&E
also proposed transfer of its 3,970 MW hydroelectric system (the largest privately-owned system in the
world) to an unregulated affiliate, but the Legislature objected to the proposal and passed AB 6X in
January 2001 to prohibit the transfer of the hydro generating assets for at least five years. The CPUC
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total installed generating capacity in the state (and 41% of total utility-
owned capacity).' 14 These in-state power plants were subsequently owned
by what Governor Davis repeatedly referred to as out-of-state generators
(although he was referring to in-state plants formerly owned by the
utilities). The ratepayers of the state, therefore, allowed the sale of
generation facilities with relatively predictable costs-the capital recovery
on $1.76 billion plus fuel and other variable operating costs-in exchange
for the possibility of cheaper power to be provided by companies that had
just spent nearly twice the book value of the generating assets the
ratepayers had just given up. The $3.33 billion earned on the asset sales,
meanwhile, went directly to the utilities rather than to ratepayers. The
utilities then fed that money to their parent corporations, who fed it either
directly to shareholders through dividends and stock repurchases (which
decreased dilution and increased the value of remaining shares) or
indirectly through investments in unregulated affiliates (whose assets were
not subject to regulation or reachable by the utilities' creditors or
ratepayers). Ratepayers remained oblivious as these changes restructured
their relationship to both their utility and the market, for their rates were
still frozen (they thought) in time. "Customer choice" remained an illusory
benefit for most, meanwhile, that could not possibly be realized until the
transition period ended.
E. Prelude to the Crisis. 1996-2000
California's new system seemed to be on cruise control during its first
two years of implementation. There were a few glitches here and there, but
they certainly did not rise to the level of broad public awareness.
Wholesale spot market prices remained low, the utilities were quickly
divesting themselves of generating assets to bring new generators into the
market, the headroom was sufficient to allow recovery of stranded costs,
and reliability seemed to be well-coordinated by the new ISO. Moreover, a
flurry of new power plant proposals beginning in 1998 promised to bring
even more competition once the transition period ended. The new owners
of the old utility plants were also proposing to make them more cost-
competitive through repowering and other improvements.
must also first review and approve any such divestiture under state Public Utilities Code § 851. PG&E
has challenged these restrictions in Bankruptcy Court, but Bankruptcy Judge Dennis Montali has so far
rejected what Assemblyman Fred Keeley has called PG&E's attempted "regulatory jailbreak" through
bankruptcy. Bob Egelko, PG&E's Bankruptcy Proposal Tossed Out; Judge Blocks Utility's Attempt to
Sidestep State Regulation, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 9, 2002, at Al; Carrie Peyton, Judge Rejects PG&E
Tactic, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 9, 2002, http://www.sacbee.com/content/news/energy/
story/1605990p- 16821 19c.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2002); Skelton, supra note 97.
114 California had 55,043 MW of total capacity (44,699 MW of utility-owned capacity) in
1997. Fisher & Duane, supra note 50, at tbl.E-3.
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But there were warning clouds on the horizon. For one thing, retail
competition was going nowhere. Industrial customers had the
sophistication and incentive to sign on with new providers, but residential
customers had little reason to switch. New competitors had to charge their
own customers to pay the CTC toward the utilities' stranded costs, which
made it extremely difficult to compete with the utilities on the basis of
price. New providers also faced sign-up costs of up to $600 per customer,
as well as the inertia of customers' familiarity with their existing utilities.
Most potential entrants to the retail market, therefore, made a decision to
wait until the transition period ended in 2002 before competing
aggressively. This meant that the utilities continued to have most of their
old customers but also faced enormous uncertainty about whether or not
they would still have those customers beyond the transition period. This
uncertainty further discouraged the utilities from making long-term
commitments to secure power through forward contracts. Low spot market
prices also discouraged new generation, for the lack of real retail
competition (together with the requirement to buy and sell through the PX)
meant that the generators could not get long-term commitments from
anybody to buy their power. New power plant investments were therefore
financially risky in California." 5
Existing participants in the wholesale market were also behaving
inconsistently with the economic theory upon which the move to
deregulation and restructuring had been based. The ISO's Market
Surveillance Committee ("MSC"), composed of three independent
economists, issued several reports noting evidence of market power in
1998 and 1999.116 The standard they used was the persistence of prices
above what a competitive market would achieve. The competitive market
price, in turn, was presumed to be equal to the price that would derive
from all bidders bidding at their marginal cost of production. Both the
MSC and other researchers estimated what the MCP should have been by
estimating the marginal costs of production for all operating plants. 117 This
115 A statewide referendum on AB 1890 was also held in November 1998, creating further
uncertainty for potential entrants to either the wholesale or retail markets. The measure, Proposition 9,
which would have mandated a 20% rate decrease and halted many aspects of AB 1890, was defeated
by the voters after pro-deregulation forces spent over $40 million to defeat it. Proposition 9 was
supported by consumer groups but opposed by some of the environmental groups at the AB 1890 table.
116 These analyses and reports are summarized in Frank A. Wolak et al., An Analysis of the
June 2000 Price Spikes in the California ISO's Energy and Ancillary Services Markets, Address before
the Market Surveillance Committee (MSC) of the California Independent System Operator (ISO)
(Sept. 6, 2000) (draft on file with Yale Journal on Regulation).
117 Academics published a number of relevant papers before the summer 2000 crisis, where
both the potential to exercise market power, e.g., JAMES BUSHNELL, WATER AND POWER:
HYDROELECTRIC RESOURCES IN THE ERA OF COMPETITION IN THE WESTERN U.S. (Program on
Workable Energy Regulation, Working Paper No. PWP-056r, July 1998), available al
http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/ucei/PDF/pwp056r.pdf, and evidence that it was already being exercised
in California, e.g., SEVERIN BORENSTEN ET AL., DIAGNOSING MARKET POWER IN CALIFORNIA'S
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was relatively easy to do with reliable estimates, since most of the
marginal generating units had been owned by the utilities until recently.
Three factors determined the marginal cost of production for natural gas-
fired power plants, which were generally at the margin: (1) the efficiency
with which fuel is burned, (2) the price of fuel, and (3) the cost of air
pollution credits (if applicable).' 18
These higher bids caused higher wholesale prices than those that
would have occurred under a truly competitive market, but the public
remained insulated from the difference because wholesale prices still
remained well below what retail rates had been historically (which had
included capital recovery). The quiet alarm raised by the MSC and other
academic studies should nevertheless not have been a surprise to
policymakers. Deregulation and restructuring in England and Wales led to
a similar experience, with strategic bidding that included physical
withholding and dramatic price increases. The British policy response
included a windfall profits tax to discourage such behavior.' 19 The CPUC's
own consultants had also flagged concern about such behavior in their
analyses of utility plant divestitures,2 but the divestitures went forward
anyway without any restrictions on such behavior or buy-back
arrangements that obligated the new owners to sell the plant's output at a
specific price during the transition period.' 21 Finally, the ISO had no
DEREGULATED WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKET (Program on Workable Energy Regulation,
Working Paper No. PWP-064, Mar. 2000), available at
http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/ucei/PDF/pwp064.pdf, were analyzed for 1998-1999. The American
Public Power Association also published an insightful analysis of some of the key structural and
institutional implications of market power in California in December 2000. See LISA G. DOWDEN ET
AL., AMERICAN PUBLIC POWER ASSOCIATION, MARKET POWER: WILL WE KNOW IT WHEN WE SEE
IT? THE CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCE (2000).
118 The analyses generally relied on market clearing prices for natural gas and Nitrogen
Oxide ("NOx") emission offset credits, although many generators probably had forward positions in
these production inputs at much lower prices. The heat rate is expressed in Therms (millions of British
Thermal Units ("MMBTU")) per unit of electricity produced (kwh), while the standard natural gas
price is per therm, or MMBTU. NOx emissions are in pounds per kwh.
119 CATHERINE D. WOLFRAM, ELECTRICITY MARKETS: SHOULD THE REST OF THE WORLD
ADOPT THE UK REFORM? (Program on Workable Energy Regulation, Working Paper No. PWP-69,
Sept. 1998), available at http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/ucei/PDF/pwp069.pdf. For a more recent
analysis, see Joe Crespo et al., Bidding Asymmetries in Multi-Unit Auctions: Implications of Bid
Function Equilibria in the British Spot Market for Electricity, Presentation to the University of
California Energy Institute P.O.W.E.R. Conference, Berkeley, Cal. (Mar. 16, 2001) (draft on file with
Yale Journal on Regulation).
120 CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, INITIAL STUDY: San Diego Gas and Electric Company's
Divesture of Electric Generating Assets, attachment C (1998), available at
http://www.sdgedivest.com/chapters/00_toc.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2002), includes a detailed
discussion of how new owners could either bid marginal costs or behave as strategic bidders. It also
suggests that there were good reasons to expect strategic bidding behavior in excess of marginal costs.
121 It is notable that the CPUC issued only a Mitigated Negative Declaration under CEQA
rather than a full-blown Environmental Impact Report ("EIR"), which would have required greater
scrutiny of the consequences of divestiture of the utilities' thermal generating units. The CPUC did
complete a Draft EIR in the case of PG&E's proposed divestiture of its hydroelectric system, which
had generated considerable controversy in the Legislature in 1999. This more comprehensive
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authority to compel production from the former utility plants or to reject
bids that clearly exceeded production costs.'
2
California regulators had already ceded most of their authority for
regulating generator or trader behavior to FERC through A.B. 1890 and its
implementation by the CPUC. Divestiture of the former utility-owned
power plants also made those divested generating units exempt wholesale
generators under the Energy Policy Act of 1992, to whom FERC had
granted "market-based" rate authority. The Federal Power Act
nevertheless still required FERC to ensure "just and reasonable" rates. 3
As a consequence, most people assumed that FERC would control market
power through its ability to rescind market-based rate authority for any
market participant who was manipulating prices. Like many of the
assumptions underlying the California experiment, that simple assumption
about FERC proved to be grievously wrong.
III. Chaos and Collapse: Economic Theory Meets Social and Political
Reality
A. Supply, Demand, and Weather. 1996-2000
California's experiment was conceived when the West was awash
with surplus power, making it difficult for any market participant to
exercise market power consistently or for a significant period of time.
Standby power prices jumped to a cost of $9,999 per MWh for four hours
on July 13, 1998 before dropping to just a penny, but observers dismissed
the incident as some kind of computer error.124 In retrospect, sellers were
document includes an analysis (which I directed) of how market power could be enhanced or
exacerbated through manipulation of production from the hydroelectric system. ASPEN ENVTL. GROUP,
PAC. GAS & ELEC. Co., SCH #2000042110, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, app. C at
6.3 (2000), available at http://cpuc-pgehydro.support.net/DraftEIR/index.html.
122 Note how this contrasts with the PJM market, where such authority does exist to
constrain market power. The California ISO does have some limited authority over so-called "Run
Must-Run" units through contracts with facilities that are deemed essential to maintain local
transmission system reliability.
123 Sections 205 and 206 of the FPA require FERC to ensure "just and reasonable" rates and
allow FERC to order refunds if that standard is not met. Federal Power Act § 205, 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a)
(2000); Federal Power Act § 206, 16 U.S.C. § 824e (2000). Ironically, FERC itself found the
wholesale spot market rates to be unjust and unreasonable in its draft order of November 1, 2000. San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 93 F.E.R.C. 61,121 (2000) (order proposing remedies). The "Analysis of the
Commission's Retroactive Refund Authority Under the Federal Power Act" contained in Appendix E
of the draft order is remarkably timid, however, as it fails to consider the new context of "market-based
rates" in its evaluation of FERC's authority to remedy the persistence of "unjust and unreasonable"
wholesale rates in California. FERC is now engaged in a proceeding to review the criteria by which it
establishes "market-based rate authority." Id. at app. E.
124 Kasler, supra note 84.
Yale Journal on Regulation
probably testing the California market periodically during the first two
years to see how it responded under particular conditions of scarcity.
121
A seller could temporarily have orchestrated an outage for a few
hours during the first two years to see how the unavailability of that plant's
output affected market clearing prices, for example, or it could bid a small
amount of its capacity into the market at very high prices to see how
competitors responded. Dozens of individual "tests" like this could go
unnoticed in the context of otherwise relatively low prices, but they would
yield important information about market structure and competitor
behavior that may then have been the basis for more aggressive strategic
behavior beginning in May 2000. It is important to note that sellers need
not necessarily collude to engage in this behavior. They may have been
independently testing the market to see if they would individually be able
to exercise market power. Unfortunately for California consumers, there
were very few incentives for competitors to undercut such strategic
bidding or physical withholding in this particular market structure-
because a higher MCP meant that all sellers would benefit with windfall
profits if the ISO called them with an urgent need for their power. The
only risk was that of lost sales at low profit margins when there was
surplus capacity.
Those tests bore little fruit during that period, however, for
hydroelectric generating conditions were especially favorable in the
Pacific Northwest from 1996 to 1999.126 These weather conditions allowed
low-cost hydropower to be dumped onto the California market whenever a
generator or trader attempted to exercise market power. The surplus
hydropower, therefore, masked the growing threat of scarcity as economic
growth and demand boomed in both California and the rest of the West
during the same period. Conventional wisdom has focused on demand
growth in California, but what happened in the rest of the WSCC is
equally important. The WSCC combined summer peak grew by 10% from
1996 to 1999, and its combined winter demand rose by 5%, but California
accounted for only 5% to 6% of the overall increase in peak summer
demands in the WSCC. However, California accounted for 45% of the
125 California Attorney General Bill Lockyer filed a $150 million lawsuit against four of the
generating companies (Dynegy, Reliant, Mirant, and Williams) on March 11, 2002 under the state's
unfair business practices act for related behavior (selling power in the spot market that had already
been promised for capacity reserves to maintain system reliability) in 1998 and 1999. Mark Martin,
State Sues 4 Energy Firms: State Alleges Scheme to Double Profits, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 12, 2002, at
Al. He filed similar charges against Mirant, Williams, Powerex (BC Hydro), and Coral Power on
April 9, 2002 for similar practices in 2000 and 2001. Mark Martin, State Sues 4 Energy Firms It Says
Gouged Consumers, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 10, 2002, at A26.
126 AsPEN ENVTL. GROUP, supra note 121, app. C at 6.3.1, fig.C.33 (2000); see also id.
app. C at 6.3 (discussing market power issues). Poor hydroelectric generation conditions and high
demand are the primary factors driving apparent scarcity (and opportunities to exercise market power),





combined winter peak increase, which increased the opportunity to
exercise market power during a traditionally low-load period of the year.
Perhaps most importantly, peak summer demand grew voraciously in the
Desert Southwest, jumping 5,000 MW (37%) in Arizona, New Mexico,
and southern Nevada from 1995 to 1999. This increase in demand soaked
up any excess capacity remaining in the region, which seriously limited
another traditional source of low-cost imports for California.
127
Continually growing demand, especially in the red-hot California
economy, then ran head-on into decreased surplus supply when the Pacific
Northwest had only an average hydroelectric power generation year in
2000.128 From 1998 to 2000, California's population grew by 1.2 million
and its economy surpassed France's to become the fifth-largest economy
in the world.' 29 Annual electricity consumption grew a surprising 3.7%
from 1998 to 1999 and a stunning 5.0% from 1999 to 2000. This
contrasted with average annual consumption growth of only 1.7% from
1977 to 1998. Peak demand actually declined in both California and
throughout the West from 1998 to 2000, however, and California added
2,781 MW of new generating capacity in 1999.130 The increased annual
consumption nevertheless meant that existing power plants had to be run
longer and harder in 2000-pushing marginal production costs up, while
creating new opportunities for in-state generators and traders to exercise
market power.
Beginning in May 2000, low-cost imports from hydro in the
Northwest and coal or nuclear power in the Southwest were no longer
available to discipline attempts to exercise market power in the
dysfunctional California market. This change gave the new owners of the
127 This analysis is based on data contained in Fisher and Duane. See Fisher & Duane, supra
note 50. Data is not available for the entire WSCC for 2000 or 2001. Previous analyses have generally
focused exclusively on California's supply and demand balance, but the entire WSCC is an
interconnected system. Traditionally, all parties benefited from the regional differences in both supply
sources and demand characteristics. The Pacific Northwest has an energy-limited, winter-peaking
system while California has a capacity-limited, summer peaking system; the total installed capacity
necessary to meet both regions' loads is therefore considerably less if each region relies upon imports
and exchanges with the other. It would therefore have been both economically inefficient and more
environmentally damaging if California had achieved self-sufficiency in generating capacity. This
generally remains true today despite calls for self-sufficiency.
128 Many reports erroneously characterize 2000 as a drought year, but it only appeared that
way in comparison with the excessively wet years from 1996 to 1999. ASPEN ENVTL. GROUP, supra
note 121, app. C at 6.3.1, fig.C.33. The region experienced its second-worst hydroelectric generation
year of record in 2001, however, leading utilities to increase rates sharply while paying 2,500 MW of
demand by large industrial customers to shut down. Carolyn Said, State's Outlook Favorable for
Blackout-Free Summer, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 2,2001, at Al.
129 Todd S. Purdum, California, Rising, Passes France on Its Climb, N.Y. TIMES, June 15,
2001, at A16.
130 California demand and capacity data for 1998-2000 from California Energy Commission
data on its web site. Cal. Energy Comm'n, Electricity in California, at
http://www.energy.ca.gov/electricity/index.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2002). Similar data is not yet
available for the entire WSCC, so we do not know how WSCC data affected availability.
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old utility plants spectacular profits from May 2000 to May 2001.13
Wholesale spot market prices skyrocketed throughout the summer,
increasing an average of four-fold after two summers at $20 to $40 per
MWh. This occurred despite the fact that peak demand was even lower in
2000 than in 1999. SDGandE customers, who had recently been exposed
to the volatile spot market due to their utility's accelerated recovery of its
stranded costs, reeled under utility bills that briefly doubled and threatened
the regional economy.132 PG&E and Edison, which were still operating
under the rate freeze, saw the CTC numbers in their bills become negative
as they began paying more for their customers' power than they were
allowed to collect each month. Most analysts focused their attention *in the
summer of 2000 on SDGandE's failure to acquire forward contracts on
behalf of its customers. The other utilities' plight was not yet well known
at the time.133  Only in September 2000-after the Legislature had
adjourned, following passage of several bills related to the SDGandE
situation-did PG&E and Edison publicly reveal their predicament. 3 4 By
then, at least the PG&E Corporation, the parent of the utility PG&E, had
already retained bankruptcy counsel and begun to "ring-fence" its
investments in unregulated affiliates from possible future claims by
PG&E's creditors, customers, or the state. 35 Due in part to such efforts,
the Attorney General of California filed a lawsuit in January 2001,
claiming that PG&E engaged in unfair business practices when PG&E
131 These profits helped to push both generating and trading company stocks to stratospheric
heights in the summer of 2000. Enron's stock price peaked in August 2000, creating pressure for
company management to keep up the appearance of continuing growth opportunities in subsequent
years. The managers were apparently rewarded with bonuses based upon the stock value at the end of
2000. Kurt Eichenwald, Enron Paid Huge Bonuses as Its Profits Were Inflated, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,
2002, at C 1.
132 James Bushnell & Erin Mansur, The Impact of Retail Rate Deregulation on Electricity
Consumption in San Diego, Presentation at the University of California Energy Institute P.O.W.E.R.
Conference, Berkeley, Cal. (Mar. 16, 2001) (draft on file with Yale Journal on Regulation).
133 The CPUC initiated an investigation into the causes of wholesale spot market price
increases, see Order Instituting Investigation into the Functioning of the Wholesale Electric Market
and Associated impact on Retail Rates, Investigation No. 00-08-002 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Aug. 3,
2000), available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUBLISHED/RULINGS/1790.htm, and SDGandE filed a
formal complaint with FERC in August 2000. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 92 F.E.R.C. 61,172
(2000) (order initiating hearing proceedings). Similar problems with PG&E and Edison are not even
mentioned in the FERC Order discussing the need for an investigation, but SDGandE's apparent
failure to hedge its position through adequate forward contracts receives extensive attention. Id.
134 Legislation dealing with the immediate retail rate impacts of the crisis, AB 1156 and AB
265, was sponsored by San Diego-area legislator Denise Ducheny; the Legislature never addressed the
prospect of similar problems with PG&E or Edison. It is unclear if PG&E or Edison discussed their
situation with the Governor or the Legislature.
135 Letter from Mark Huffman, PG&E, to CPUC Administrative Law Judge Walwyn,
(undated) (describing "any changes made in the holding company and affiliate relationships since





transferred $4.6 billion of revenue to its parent corporation in violation of
state laws requiring the parent corporation to keep the utility whole) 3 6
B. Convergence and Crisis. 2000-2001
How and why did wholesale spot market prices go through the roof?.
As noted above, the California system had several design flaws that
discouraged long-term forward contracts and increased the likelihood
(while decreasing the risk for sellers) of market manipulation under
conditions of scarcity. Continuing movement toward such conditions
through growing demand and decreasing surpluses was then masked from
1996 to 1999 by above-average hydroelectric generation conditions in the
Pacific Northwest, moving the state's system close to the precipice of
disaster without adequate warning. Warning signs were also largely
ignored or dismissed. 3 7 Four specific factors then converged to create the
catastrophic market response in California in 2000 and 2001. None of
them would have occurred under the old rate-of-return regulated utility
system, but all of them could occur again under the current system.
First, apparent manipulation in natural gas markets led to a dramatic
rise in natural gas prices. The CPUC filed allegations with FERC in April
2000 that El Paso Corporation had rigged the bidding for its pipeline
capacity in favor of an affiliate and then manipulated physical quantities of
gas to California to drive the price up. 138 Natural gas prices at the
California border, which are normally only slightly higher than prices
elsewhere in the country, jumped from $2.50 per MMBTU in 1999 to $40
to $50 per MMBTU in late-2000 (while they only increased to $6 to $7 per
MMBTU) elsewhere. 39 This drove up the price of electricity dramatically
because MCPs were set based upon the last winning bid-which was
usually the most inefficient natural gas-fired power plant running.
California consumers, therefore, paid for the higher gas prices through
higher prices for all of the electricity purchased in the market. This was
even true for utility-owned generation, which received a "payment" credit
under the AB 1890 scheme that was based on the PX price rather than
actual costs of production. (Roughly half of the "debt" incurred by the
utilities in 2000 was actually for utility-owned generation that did not rely
136 Cooper & Peyton, supra note 107.
137 The CEC issued warnings in 1998 that the state could face shortages by 2000. See
Wilson, supra note 108.
138 Davan Maharaj & Christine Hanley, Suit Claims Firms Limited Gas Supply to Raise
Prices, LA. TtMEs, Feb. 4, 2001, at Al; Bernadette Tansey, Price Gouging Case Strong, Judge Says,
S.F. CHRON., Aug. 7, 2001, at Al.
139 Paul Joskow & Edward Kahn, A Quantitative Analysis of Pricing Behavior in
California's Wholesale Electricity Market During Summer 2000, Presentation at the University of
California Energy Institute P.O.W.E.R. Conference, Berkeley, Cal. (Mar. 16, 2001).
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overwhelmingly on natural gas as a fuel, so the actual money owed other
parties was significantly less than the accounting "debt.") 140
The precise drivers of natural gas price increases in California in 2000
and 2001 remain in dispute. FERC's Administrative Law Judge initially
indicated in the case that there was prima facie evidence of market power.
He then, however, softened the blow two months later when issuing his
decision, by saying that "El Paso Pipeline and El Paso Merchant had the
ability to exercise market power," but that "the record in this case is not at
all clear that they in fact exercised market power." He nevertheless found
El Paso to be in "clear violation" of FERC rules regarding affiliate
relationships. 14' The parent corporation of SDGandE, Sempra Energy, has
also been charged in a lawsuit by Los Angeles County with manipulating
natural gas prices through a massive conspiracy with its subsidiaries,
including the Southern California Gas Company. 42 Finally, there is a
possibility that electricity market manipulation directly affected natural gas
prices due to pass-through and net indexing provisions in contracts
between gas suppliers and electricity generators. This relationship has not
yet been thoroughly investigated, but, if true, it would tend to camouflage
much of the evidence of electricity market manipulation due to the
assumption by most analysts that natural gas prices are independent of
electricity markets and that those prices represent production cost inputs.
Any of these possibilities is more plausible than the simple "market
demand" explanation because the differentials between prices in California
and the rest of the nation's natural gas markets cannot be explained by
increased market demand alone.
Second, selective physical withholding of generation increased
conditions of scarcity to allow strategic bidding on a more reliable basis.
This issue is still being investigated by the CPUC, FERC, the California
Attorney General, and the California Legislature, but several published
studies have found evidence of significant physical withholding, which
140 Note that the new pricing system effectively made all generation costs (including low
variable-cost nuclear, coal, hydro, wind, geothermal and solar-powered generation) subject to volatile
variation in natural gas prices, thereby eliminating all of the financial benefits otherwise associated
with the remarkable physical diversity of the California generation system. The California system's
physical diversity had previously served to protect California ratepayers from excessive dependence
upon single fuels, and the regulated rate structure moderated cost variation even further. See generally
Timothy P. Duane, The Risk-Adjusted Cost Evaluation of Electric Resource Alternatives (1989)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with author). Increased volatility serves
the interests of traders like Enron, who increase their role in volatile markets as well as their potential
for profits. Any FERC investigation into Enron's role in the California crisis should therefore examine
its influence on the volatility of market prices as well as the level of those prices. Enron is likely to
have benefited more from increased volatility than from increased average prices.
141 Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Judge Issues Mixed Findings on Big Utility in Gas Price Case,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 10, 2001, at C4; Tansey, supra note 138, at At.
142 Troy Anderson, Foul Windfall?; L.A. County Claims Sempra Part of Price Conspiracy,
L.A. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 12, 2002, at N5.
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reduced system reliability and increased apparent scarcity in the California
market. 143  Even FERC has found some evidence of physical
withholding. 44 Physical withholding is probably not as important as
strategic bidding in explaining the increase in wholesale prices, 14  but it
played a prominent role in the rolling outages of 2001. There was not a
single day in the winter and spring of 2001 when total system demand was
greater than California-installed generating capacity. Instead, rolling
blackouts occurred because generating units were "unavailable" at a rate
four to five times the historic or industry averages, even after accounting
for the age of the facilities. 146 System managers at the ISO started each day
not knowing how they were going to meet demand that particular day, and
that condition persisted throughout the day nearly every day from January
2001 to May 2001. They knew where the power plants were that could
meet that demand, but they no longer had the authority to compel the
owners of those power plants to turn them on or to sell their output into the
California grid at a reasonable price. The "shortages" that caused the
rolling blackouts were therefore an institutional artifact of California's
market structure rather than a physical phenomenon. 14  Installed
143 1 am unable to comment directly on these investigations, because I was under contract as
a senior policy consultant to the CPUC on a variety of issues in 2000 and 2001. All of my discussion
here is based on published information. See Robert McCullough, Price Spike Tsunami: How Market
Power Soaked California, PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY, Jan. 1, 2001, at 22-32 (completing work on
behalf of a group of utilities); Joskow & Kahn, supra note 139 (completing work on behalf of Southern
California Edison).
144 Russell Ray, Williams Blasts CBS Report; Smoking Gun Evidence of Power Price
Gouging Is Being Denied, TULSA WORLD, July 28, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
145 The ISO estimates that physical withholding accounted for about 10% of excess prices in
2000, while economic withholding (strategic bidding) accounted for about 70%, and a combination of
the two explains the remaining 20%. See ANJALI SHEFFRIN, EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF STRATEGIC
BIDDING IN CALIFORNIA ISO REAL-TIME MARKET (Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Report, Mar. 21, 2001);
ERIC HILDEBRANDT, FURTHER ANALYSES OF THE EXERCISE AND COST IMPACTS OF MARKET POWER
IN CALIFORNIA'S WHOLESALE ENERGY MARKET (Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator, Mar. 2001).
146 High levels of plant outages began in January 2001 and persisted until May 2001, totaling
14,400 MW (25%) of California's 57,660 MW of installed generating capacity during the rolling
blackouts from May 7 to May 8. Some of those outages reflected planned maintenance (e.g., for
refueling PG&E's Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant) and low hydroelectric availability (especially
during the winter months) due to a drought in the Pacific Northwest. Planned outages nevertheless
could have, and would have, been coordinated to avoid rolling blackouts under a regulated utility
system. FERC completed a cursory analysis of the causes of outages that relied upon inadequate data
collection and weak analysis, but it was later criticized by the General Accounting Office. OFFICE OF
THE GENERAL COUNSEL & OFFICE OF MARKETS, TARIFFS, AND RATES, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM'N,
REPORT ON PLANT OUTAGES IN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA (2001), available at http://www.ferc.gov/
electric/bulkpower/Public-Febl.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2002). The GAO study identified serious
methodological problems in the FERC study, which primarily relied upon phone interviews with
power plant operators to determine if they were physically withholding generating capacity from the
market. The FERC study is also filled with simple arithmetic errors that masked shifts in outage rates
for units. For example, a smaller-capacity unit increased its capacity factor while a larger-capacity unit
decreased its capacity factor, thereby reducing the overall capacity factor of the plant while increasing
average capacity factors for the two units. FERC then failed to catch this effect when summarizing
average outage rates.
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generating capacity actually exceeded peak demand by a wide margin
during this period.
The generators' ability to exercise market power was seriously
underestimated by the FERC, the CPUC, and the state legislature when
AB 1890 was passed. This, again, reflected a fundamental failure to
appreciate the original rationale for regulating the electric utility industry:
Due to specific technological characteristics of the electricity grid,
generators can extract monopoly rents whenever their production is
necessary to meet demand and to maintain system reliability. When
presented with opportunities to extract monopoly rents, monopolists
generally will act to maximize net profits as long as it is legal or they
believe they will get away with it. This remains as true today as it did a
century ago, when monopolistic behavior led to the passage of antitrust
legislation by Congress. Unfortunately, it is a lesson that seems to have
been forgotten by FERC when it authorized market-based rates for
California wholesale generators. Instead of carefully analyzing the market,
FERC simply assumed that market power was unlikely to be exercised as
long as no single generator controlled more than 20% of the generation in
the entire state.
FERC made this glaring error for two reasons: (1) It relied upon
inappropriate generic industry concentration measures used by the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in merger cases
to evaluate whether or not utility divestiture would result in a competitive
market, and then (2) it misapplied those inappropriate measures to the
California electricity market by construing the California market too
broadly. 148  Generation that was not competitively bidding into the
market-but was either serving a utility's own demand or was already
committed to do so through long-term contracts-should not have been
considered in the denominator of the market concentration calculation.
Roughly 60% of in-state generation fell into this category. The remaining
40% of in-state generation was, and remains, concentrated among just a
147 This unwillingness to sell power into the California market was exacerbated by the
utilities' credit crunch, of course, but that concern was effectively dealt with when the state took over
purchases on behalf of the utilities.
148 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1992) (revised Apr. 8,
1997), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2002). This
standard does not work well for electricity markets, however, for there may be distinct sub-markets
under particular weather conditions (e.g., summer vs. winter; wet hydro vs. dry hydro). In California,
there are two major geographic sub-markets separated by a transmission bottleneck known as Path 15.
Market prices have therefore always been differentiated in the PX and ISO as NP 15 (North of Path 15)
or SP 15 (South of Path 15). A third category (Zone 26) was also created after the market was initially
established to prevent gaming by a particular generator who was suspected of artificially manipulating
transmission loading in a particular transmission-constrained area. Series of interviews with former
ISO staff who requested anonymity, 2000-2001.
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handful of firms. 14 9 Each of these firms individually controlled roughly as
much or more of the competitively bid market for electricity in California
as the Arab members of OPEC controlled of the American oil market in
1973."50 FERC's simplistic application of the DOJ merger guidelines to the
American oil market in 1973 therefore would have found no risk of these
suppliers exercising market power, but the embargo raised prices from less
than $2 per barrel before October 1973 to almost $12 per barrel in less
than five months. 5' Once again, an ahistorical and apolitical view of
market economics meant that policymakers failed to recognize the
manipulative potential of these market shares.
In essence, FERC assumed that a firm with less than 20% market
share could not exercise market power. This assumption is only valid if
there is at least a 20% reserve margin at all times, however, because power
generated by firms with smaller market shares are essential to meet system
demand any time the reserve margin is lower. (This is even more true
within specific geographic sub-markets, where transmission constraints
may limit the ability of suppliers in one part of the state to meet system
demand in another part of the state.) The specific technological
characteristics of electricity directly translate into enhanced market power
for generators and traders holding much smaller market shares than 20%.
Any of the major generators could therefore exercise market power on any
day in which system demand came close to overall system capacity. A
firm with only 1% of total capacity could even exercise market power on
days when all generating capacity is necessary to meet peak demand.
Firms with 2% to 8% of total generating capacity and 4% to 19% of
competitively bid generating capacity (as each of the seven major firms
held in 2000) could therefore exercise market power often once reserve
margins tightened in May 2000.
Third, decreased availability of air quality emission offsets in
southern California put further pressure on both bids and availability. Air
quality standards have gradually tightened over the past three decades in
California, but the investor-owned utilities would have had incentives to
install new equipment to meet those standards under cost-of-service rate
149 AES/Williams had 4,071 MW (8% of total capacity, but 19% of competitive bidding
capacity), Reliant had 3,065 MW (7% and 17%), Mirant (formerly the Southern Company) had 3,065
MW (6% and 14%), Duke had 2,950 MW (6% and 14%), Dynegy had 1,550 MW (3% and 7%),
Destec had 1,169 MW (2% and 6%), and Calpine had 871 MW (2% and 4%). Memorandum from
Michael Kahn, Chairman of the Electricity Oversight Board, & Loretta Lynch, President of the CPUC,
to Governor Gray Davis 16 (Aug. 2, 2000). These figures do not include import capacity, which give
other out-of-state firms market power and reduce these relative market shares. Also note that some
market brokers, such as Enron, sometimes controlled total generation comparable to each of these
actual generating companies.
150 Only 5% of American oil demand was met by these sources (12% from OPEC suppliers)
in 1973. HIRSH, supra note 11, at 312-13 n.30.
151 Id. at 61, 312-13 n.30.
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regulation. Those incentives dissipated with the passage of AB 1890 and
subsequent divestiture of the generating units by the utilities, leading the
new owners generally to acquire tradable emission offset credits rather
than to make new investments in emission controls. The PX pricing system
assured them that they would be able to recover the cost of such credits,
since bidders would directly incorporate their variable costs for such
credits into their bids. Investments in emission controls required a capital
commitment, however, which might not be recovered in the uncertain
California market. Tighter availability of such credits, together with
increased periods of generation by some key plants in southern California,
then put pressure on market prices in 2000. 52 The price for credits shot up
from $1 to $2 per pound of nitrogen oxide ("NOx") emissions in 1999 to
$35 per pound in late summer 2000.'1 3 Once again, those higher marginal
costs for gas-fired generation translated directly into higher market
clearing prices for all generation-even if the source was a clean
renewable energy project.
Finally-and most importantly-FERC failed miserably in its duty to
enforce the law and discipline the anti-competitive behavior driving the
increases. It appears to have done so for two reasons: (1) It misunderstood
and misdiagnosed California's problem as primarily being one of a supply-
and-demand imbalance, and (2) its entire program of promoting
competitive wholesale power markets would have been, and remains,
threatened by any other interpretation of the causes of the California crisis.
FERC, therefore, laid the blame for the problem primarily on the design
flaws in California's system. This deflected attention from widespread
deficiencies in the regulatory relationship between FERC and the market,
giving a green light for further market manipulation. FERC essentially
claimed it had no responsibility for the crisis by blaming California for its
flawed implementation of deregulation, which, notably, had earlier been
approved by FERC.
FERC's greatest failure occurred when it effectively announced on
November 1, 2000 that it would not enforce the Federal Power Act. The
agency opened the. door for rampant abuse that day by declaring that it had
no authority, or at least was unwilling, to issue an order to refund the
152 There have been no published studies of potential manipulation of the NOx emission
offset market, but Ed Kahn has suggested that it is a ripe area for investigation. Ed Kahn, Presentation
at the University of California Energy Institute P.O.W.E.R. Conference, Berkeley, Cal. 2 (Mar. 16,
2001). Note that the increased annual consumption in 1999 and 2000 resulted in generators using up
their annual emission credits and running up against annual hourly emission limits in the South Coast
Air Quality Management District.
153 Joskow & Kahn, supra note 139, at 13-14. Note that many generators held ample credits,
so their real production costs did not increase directly. The higher opportunity cost of using the credits
was nevertheless reflected in higher bid prices throughout the Southern California generation market.
This, in turn, affected the opportunity cost for importers and Northern California sellers to the extent
that they could otherwise sell power in Southern California.
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excessive charges from May to October 2000 to sanction those who had
caused "unjust and unreasonable" wholesale rates, 54 FERC noted, in the
same draft order, that wholesale rates already were unjust and
unreasonable, but the agency refused to take the necessary action to deter
further market manipulation. Spot market price forecasts issued before
FERC's action showed prices going down during the low-demand winter
and spring months, but actual prices shot up as soon as it became apparent
that FERC was just a paper tiger. FERC's timidity opened the floodgates
for the wholesale generators and sellers. As Severin Borenstein put it,
"[Y]ou cannot just open the cage and walk away" when deregulating
electricity markets.' 55 Yet, that is effectively what FERC did at the critical
moment of the California crisis: It walked away from its role as a
regulator, leaving the market wide-open for extraction of monopoly rents
at California's expense.'5 6 The result was just what one would expect if the
police were to walk away from an angry and drunken crowd that was
already in a frenzy: The equivalent of outright looting occurred in plain
sight.
C. Band-Aids on the Wound: 2001-?
The California system was in free-fall during the winter of 2001, as
the situation appeared to worsen by the day. PG&E and Edison stopped
paying some of their bills in January, exacerbating the problem of physical
withholding that placed the state in Stage 3 alerts on a daily basis. Rolling
blackouts threatened both economic activities and people's lives. The state
finally stepped in, through its Department of Water Resources ("DWR"),
to buy power on behalf of the cash-strapped utilities as sellers insisted on a
"credit-worthy" buyer. Wholesale power prices nevertheless jumped to as
high as $3,800 per MWh (roughly 100 to 200 times the average price one
year earlier) as the desperate DWR struggled to learn a new role and keep
the lights on. The Governor declared a state of emergency and promised to
154 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 93 F.E.R.C. T 61,121, 61,349 (2000) (order proposing
remedies); OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL & OFFICE OF MARKETS, TARIFFS, AND RATES, supra
note 146.
155 Severin Borenstein, Director of the University of California Energy Institute, Presentation
to the Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, Berkeley (Feb. 14, 2001) (transcript
on file with author).
156 The uncertainty surrounding the Presidential election of 2000 then exacerbated the
situation, for FERC's future direction and leadership lay in doubt for five weeks after the November 1,
2000 draft order was issued. Democratic Governor Gray Davis held out hope throughout the suspended
election count that Democratic Presidential candidate Al Gore would push FERC in a favorable
direction after Davis helped Gore win California's electoral votes by a wide popular vote margin. The
"final" order in the proceeding was issued December 15, 2000. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 93
F.E.R.C. 61,294 (2000) (order directing remedies).
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get as many new power plants built as possible, 5 7 the CPUC adopted a
$5.7 billion annual rate increase, and the pundits had a field day criticizing
California's political leaders from afar. The conventional wisdom was
simple: California needed to build more supply to meet its current and
projected demand. The conventional wisdom was also focused just on a
symptom, rather than the root cause of the crisis. Therefore, most of the
purported "solutions" to the crisis that were adopted in 2000 and 2001
generally fail to address the underlying structural causes of the crisis.
California risked a genuine shortage of generating capacity a few
days each summer in 2000 and 2001,158 but the price spikes and rolling
blackouts of winter and spring simply would not have occurred if the
utilities had still owned and operated their old power plants. 159 This is also
true for the price spikes of summer 2000 that first precipitated the crisis. 6 °
Moreover, the price spikes themselves had little influence upon whether
new generation would be forthcoming to fill the deficit. The CEC issued
permits for nine new power plants, with a potential generating capacity
totaling 6,278 MW, from 1998 to 2000 and was considering applications
for fourteen more (totaling 7,736 MW) by the end of 2000, but few of
those plants were expected to be on-line before 2002 or 2003.161 New
power plants were therefore only going to be useful in alleviating a small
part of the crisis. 162 Governor Davis nevertheless saw the supply-demand
157 Governor Davis issued a proclamation declaring a state of emergency on January 17,
2001. Proclamation by the Governor of the State of California, State of Emergency (Jan. 17, 2001),
available at http://www.govemor.ca.gov/.
158 Even this risk was relatively low if the summer was unusually cool or average in
temperature; the real risk was from a "heat storm" that could drive up electricity demand for air
conditioning and agricultural water pumping.
159 The utilities would have coordinated and modified power plant maintenance schedules to
respond to any anticipated shortages, and they would have had incentives to invest in pollution-control
equipment during the preceding few years in anticipation of the increased scarcity of emission offset
credits beginning in 2000. The only factors that would have been beyond utility control would be
hydroelectric conditions and nuclear fueling cycles (which had a brief impact on generating capacity at
PG&E's Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant in late spring).
160 Generating costs would have been higher for the utilities due to the need to use more
inefficient plants, but those higher costs would have only applied to the small fraction of total power
produced by those plants. In contrast, those high prices applied to all power produced and sold through
the PX or ISO under the AB 1890 structure. The old utility-operated system would still face risks of
rolling blackouts during the peak summer demand period.
161 ROBERT THERKELSEN, CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, CALIFORNIA'S ELECTRICITY SITUATION:
AN OVERVIEW (2001) (handout for presentation to California State Assembly members, Sacramento,
Cal., Jan. 31, 2001) (on file with Yale Journal on Regulation). The CEC had already approved 3,648
MW of new capacity by May 2000, then approved 2,630 MW from October to December 2000.
Another fifteen projects totaling 7,960 MW of new capacity had been publicly announced by January
2001 but were not yet formally under review for CEC permits. Id.
162 The parallels to the Bush Administration's 2001 National Energy Plan are striking. By
focusing exclusively on long lead-time supply expansion projects, the National Energy Plan fails to
address the structural relationships in energy markets as well as the opportunities to manage demand or
existing supply more efficiently in order to meet the economy's needs. More efficient management of




imbalance as a simple way to explain the problem and what he was doing
about it. New power plant openings also offered important photo
opportunities for the Governor, who had already raised $26 million (about
$35,000 per day) towards his 2002 reelection campaign during the first
two years of his term in 1999 and 2000.163 "Generation comes up in our
polls as being the No. 1 thing people want us to do-build more power
plants," said Davis political advisor and pollster Garry South in the
summer of 2001. "People want the sense that progress is being made-that
this is not spiraling out of control. 164
This political concern about appearing to be in control became even
more paramount when PG&E filed for bankruptcy on April 6, the morning
163 Davis's fundraising includes significant contributions from power companies and
utilities. According to Common Cause, Davis received $178,510 from generators and $348,022 from
utilities from 1999 to 2000 for a total of $526,532. Key legislators have also received extensive
contributions from these groups. CALIFORNIA COMMON CAUSE, CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY
UTILITIES AND POWER PRODUCERS, 1999-2000 (2001). Davis has continued to accept such
contributions despite promising in early 2001 not to do so. Dan Morain, Generators Add to Davis
Coffers, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2001, at 7. The state's investor owned utilities and private power
producers or traders spent a stunning $17 million in 1999 and 2000 in political contributions and
lobbying expenses at the state and local levels. Enron led all non-utility producers and traders,
spending more than $300,000 on campaigns and more than $345,000 on lobbying. Energy Crisis
Linked to Campaign Contributions, CALIFORNIA COMMON CAUSE, Fall/Winter 2002, at 1.
164 Carrie Peyton, Third Power Plant Opens, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 10, 2001, at A5.
Power plant siting was expedited and some environmental standards were relaxed through both
gubernatorial Executive Orders and legislation in 2000-2001. Expedited six month and four month
permitting processes were first established by AB 970. See Assemb. B. 970, 2001-2000 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2000); Cal. Exec. Order No. D-28-01 (Mar. 7, 2001) available at
http://www.govemor.ca.gov/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2002); S.B. 28x, 2001-2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2001). The four-month process permitted simple-cycle gas-fired plants (which pollute more than
combined-cycle plants) as long as they were on-line by August 31, 2001, extended to August 31, 2002
by Executive Order on March 7, 2001. Cal. Exec. Order No. D-28-01 (Mar. 7, 2001), available at
http://www.govemor.ca.gov/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2002). This accelerated review period contrasts with
the normal twelve-month CEC siting process, under which fourteen projects were approved from 1999
to 2001 for a total of 10,439 MW of new capacity. Note that the accelerated plants would not
necessarily be available at all during the period of forecast potential shortages during summer 2001 or
summer 2002.
The Governor also issued Executive Orders D-22-01, D-24-01, and D-26-01 on February 8,
2001 to streamline the power plant siting process and to weaken air quality regulations for power plant
operation. Cal. Exec. Order No. D-22-01 (Feb. 8, 2001), available at http://www.govemor.ca.gov/ (last
visited Apr. 25, 2002), Cal. Exec. Order No. D-24-01 (Feb. 8, 2001), available at
http://www.govemor.ca.gov/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2002), Cal. Exec. Order No. D-26-01 (Feb. 8, 2001),
available at http://www.goveMor.ca.gov/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2002). Cal. Exec. Order D-28-01 also
exempted agencies from the Administrative Procedures Act when changing siting regulations. Cal.
Exec. Order No. D-28-01 (Mar. 7, 2001), available at http://www.govemor.ca.gov/ (last visited Apr.
25, 2002). Together, these orders created an expedited siting process for "peaking" power plants that
allowed only seven days for CEQA review and required permits to be issued within twenty-one days as
long as the plant was on-line by September 30, 2001. Although five projects proposed under this
process (totaling 550 MW) were later withdrawn due to strong public opposition, eleven projects were
approved for a total of 864 MW. Anne E. Simon, Environmental Justice in Power Plant Siting: Is It a
Contradiction in Terms?, Address to California State Bar Association Environmental Law Conference,
Fish Camp, Cal. (Oct. 28, 2001). Executive Order D-40-01 further weakend air quality regulations on
all power plants. Cal. Exec. Order No. D-40-01 (Jun. 11, 2001), available at
http://www.govemor.ca.gov/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2002).
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after an unprecedented prime-time television address by the Governor on
the crisis. 165 Governor Davis then quickly negotiated a bailout deal over
the weekend with Edison in an attempt to forestall another Chapter 11
filing during his watch. The Governor gave away the store in his panic,
though, which made the deal dead on arrival by the time it reached the
state Legislature. 166 Meanwhile, the bills continued to mount as the state
DWR picked up the tab to keep the lights on. First intended as a temporary
measure that Would cost no more than $500 million, between $6 billion
and $9 billion had been drained from the state's General Fund, out of a
budget of $80 billion, and another $4 billion borrowed in short-term loans
to keep the lights on through the end of November 2001 167
165 PG&E subsequently proposed a Plan of Reorganization (POR) which would have split
the company into a variety of subsidiaries, all of which would be exempt from CPUC oversight except
for the distribution company. Moreover, the utility argued that the federal bankruptcy laws preempted
dozens of state laws requiring both extensive environmental review of the consequences and CPUC
approval of such a plan. Although the major creditors supported the POR, it was challenged by the
state and consumer groups. Bankruptcy Judge Dennis Montali roundly rejected the PG&E proposal on
February 8, 2002, calling it an "across-the-board, take-no-prisoners" strategy. He then authorized the
CPUC to offer an alternative POR and called the parties into mediated settlement discussions. See Bob
Egelko, PG&E's Bankruptcy Proposal Tossed Out; Judge Blocks Utility's Attempt to Sidestep State
Regulation, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 9, 2002, at Al; Carrie Peyton, Judge Rejects PG&E Tactic,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 9, 2002, http://www.sacbee.com/content/news/energy/story/1605990p-
1682119c.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2002).
166 The California State Senate passed legislation supporting a modified "work out" of
Edison's debt before the summer recess, but Edison indicated it was not enough. The California State
Assembly then passed a bill that met the Governor and Edison's terms, but senate leader John Burton
refused to bring it to a floor vote on the last day of the session. Governor Davis lambasted Burton and
the Senate, threatening to call them back for a special session to vote on the measure. Burton
responded that he was trying to avoid embarrassment for the Governor by not bringing the bill to the
floor. The CPUC then saved face for the Governor by negotiating a settlement to a lawsuit by Edison
that gave both Edison and the Governor what they wanted-without the risk of any legislative solution
being subject to a voter referendum. The deal allowed Edison to pay off its creditors during the spring
of 2002. SCE Gets Financing, Pays Creditors $4.8 Bin, REUTERS; Carrie Peyton et al., Session's End
Leaves Edison in Limbo, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 16, 2001, at A3; George Skelton, While Davis and
Burton Bicker, Edison Awaits a Rescue Measure, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2001, at B3; George Skelton, 2
Scary B-Words: Bailout, Bankruptcy, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2001, at B5. L.A. Governor Davis recently
acknowledged that he panicked during the heat of the crisis in a defensive exchange with the editorial
board of the San Diego Tribune. "If I didn't panic," he said, "you wouldn't be able to put out your
paper. I saved this friggin' paper. I kept the lights on. Do you understand that? I kept the lights on."
Phillip Matier & Andrew Ross, However You Color Them, State Security Costs Are Staggering, S.F.
CHRON., Mar. 13, 2002, at A21. The Governor has also likened his struggle through the energy crisis
as "tougher than being in Vietnam. I fought my way through it." Richard L. Berke, California
Governor Looks to a Predecessor's Playbook for Fall Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2002, at A24.
167 The exact amount is difficult to determine, but California State Treasurer Phil Angelides
says that the state will face a current-year deficit of S9.3 billion if he is unable to sell $12 to $14 billion
in long-term revenue bonds by June 28, 2002 to finance the short-term debts incurred by the General
Fund. The Contra Costa Times estimates the state spent $7.9 billion through bilateral contracts and the
ISO spent another $4 billion during the first six months of 2001. Mike Taugher, Public Utilities Hiked
Sell-Back Prices, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Dec. 18, 2001, at Al [hereinafter Taugher, Public]. This
appears to involve a combination of at least $6 billion from the state general fund, a $4.6 billion short-
term loan (part of that amount due by June 28, 2002), and the remainder paid for through higher retail
rates. Mike Taugher, Scramble for Energy Leaves State Vulnerable, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Dec. 21,
2001, at Al [hereinafter Taugher, Scramble]. The 2001 expenditures for short-term energy supplies
were clearly at least twice and possibly as much as four times the $3.3 billion that generators spent
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California also entered into dozens of long-term forward contracts
during the spring of 2001 at relatively high prices that were designed to
push the real costs of the crisis until after the November 2002 statewide
election. Energy analysts in 2001 generally expected conditions of relative
scarcity to persist in the California market only until 2003 or 2004, when
new generation already permitted and under construction would exert
strong downward price pressure on the wholesale spot market. 168 The
longer-term contracts would secure much higher prices well after that
period when generators and traders would otherwise have expected to
receive higher prices in the market. This allowed generators and traders to
offer power at a lower rate in the near-term. These contracts, therefore,
would achieve Governor Davis's political goal of keeping prices relatively
low until after the election. 69 The contracts commit ratepayers to much
higher-priced power than they could have achieved under either the old
cost-of-service regime or by building publicly-owned power plants. They
therefore impose significant costs on the state even if they helped to reduce
short-term wholesale spot market prices (by reducing the amount of
demand that needs to be met on the spot market). The state has already lost
money on the contracts in the face of declining demand by having to resell
some of the high-priced power on the spot market for pennies on the
dollar. 7 °
Recently, both the CPUC and the Governor have realized after a
critical audit from the independent California Bureau of State Audits that
the DWR contracts are a bad deal for California ratepayers. They have
therefore attempted to re-negotiate the contract terms in order to soften the
impact of the high-priced contracts on the California economy. "We can
do it easy or we can do it hard," said CPUC President Loretta Lynch, "but
it will be done.' 71 Negotiations were initially unsuccessful, so the CPUC
filed a $21 billion claim with FERC in February 2002 to get FERC to
from 1996 to 1999 to acquire 18,348 MW of former utility generating plants. State's Average Daily
Power Costs Drop, Even During Hottest Part of Year, MARIN INDEP. J., Nov. 29, 2001, at C5. The
CPUC finally approved a plan in February 2002 to allocate future power revenues to allow the state to
sell $11.1 billion in bonds, so the state should be able to avoid defaulting. Mike Taugher, State Seeks
$11 Billion for Electricity, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, at DI.
168 As for the knowledge of "experts" who now say (or said then) that Governor Davis
should not have signed long-term contracts, Governor Davis has said, "They don't know squat."
Matier & Ross, supra note 166.
169 Davis refused to release details of the contracts after they were negotiated, arguing that
releasing the information before January 2003 could jeopardize further negotiations. Negotiations,
however, were already completed, so the only relevance of the January 2003 date appears to be that
Davis expects to begin his second term as Governor that month. News organizations and Republican
legislators successfully sued in 2001 to have the basic terms of the contracts made public. As a
consequence, some limited information has now been released about the terms of the contracts.
170 Carrie Peyton, State Moves to Pull Plug on Worst Power Contracts, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Jan. 10, 2002, at Al; Mike Taugher, Scramble, supra note 167; Nancy Vogel & Virginia Ellis, State
Expects Huge Losses on Surplus Power, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2001, at Al.
171 Peyton, supra note 170.
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declare the contracts, which had been declared the previous year by the
Governor to be a good deal for the state, null and void.172 Based on an
estimated original cost of $43 billion over the life of the contracts,
California had committed to piy roughly twice the actual unmanipulated
market value of the electricity. The excess long-term costs represent about
six times the revenue earned when the utilities sold many of the generating
plants from which the state is now buying power. Newer power plants are
considerably more efficient than these older utility plants, so the real cost
of providing such power over the long term should be much less than the
contracted price.
Viewing California as an accident victim, it is as if the public and
policymakers saw only her superficial wounds whenever they first realized
there was a crisis. Not surprisingly,
. 
a lot of attention has been paid to
repairing those wounds. An apparent scarcity of generating capacity was
only superficial, though; the real problem has always been internal
hemorrhaging. The only thing that has kept the patient alive so far has
been a massive transfusion from the state's General Fund. This has kept
the lights on, but it has not addiessed the underlying cause of the patient's
condition. Because rolling blackouts have ended (for now), people are
acting as if she has survived the crisis. 173 Yet,, the state is continuing to
hemorrhage money and opportunity due to her massive internal injuries.
That unstable condition will continue until the underlying structural issues
that caused the accident are addressed.
The result of this misdirected focus on the supply-and-demand
balance has been the transfer of billions of dollars of wealth from
electricity consumers and taxpayers to utility shareholders, power brokers,
and independent generators. Very little of that wealth transfer constitutes
an improvement in economic efficiency. California spent $7 billion for all
of its electricity in 1999, but the bill jumped to about $27 billion in 2000.
Another $27 billion was spent in 2001. The difference of $40 billion over
just two years would not have occurred without the convergence of the
factors described above, so it represents a genuine cost, together with the
172 Karen Gaudette, California Plans to Ask Federal Energy Regulators to Reverse Power
Contracts, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 25, 2002, available at LEXIS, Wires Library, AP File. The CPUC
filed the request with FERC on February 25, 2002. The state has since reached some agreements to
alter the terms of the original deals. Nancy Vogel, Power Sellers Told to Bargain on Pacts, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 25, 2002, at B7.
173 John Hill, The Lights Are On, So Why is Joe Dunn Still Digging?, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Dec. 16, 2001, at At; Carolyn Said, State's Outlook Favorable for Blackout-Free Summer, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 7, 2001, at Al; Mark Sappenfield, The Energy Crisis That Wasn't, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Aug. 6, 2001, at 1. The Field Poll found that only 44% of Californians still thought the
electricity crisis was "very serious" in September 2001 (before the events of September 11), down
from 75% in May 2001. The percentage who thought the problem was "under control today" jumped
from 0% to 30% during that period. Mark DiCamillo & Mervin Field, Public Considerably Less
Concerned About Electricity Supply, THE FIELD POLL No. 2010, Sept. 25, 2001, at 2-3, available at
http://field.community/fieldpollonline/subscribers/Rls2010.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2002).
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transfers of billions of dollars in headroom from 1998 to 2000, of
deregulation and restructuring. The increased costs in 2000 and 2001 are
comparable to the total annual state budget-$42 billion-for all levels of
education in 2001 to 2002. The long-term contracts commit ratepayers to
at least another $21 billion in excess costs. In comparison, the state's entire
budget in Fiscal Year 2001-2002 was just under $80 billion.
Finding a way to pay those bills will now cost California ratepayers
and taxpayers tens of billions of dollars in missed opportunities over at
least the next fifteen to twenty years. 74 The California crisis therefore
threatens to make the state effectively insolvent in its ability to do the
things that states are supposed to do. Even if the electricity debt gets
repaid, California taxpayers and ratepayers will be paying for this mess in
higher electric bills, higher taxes, a weaker economy, poorer schools, more
crowded and more dangerous roads, more children without adequate
healthcare, more crime, and closed parks.175 The state itself also faces a
continuing fiscal crisis if the underlying structural causes of the problem
are not addressed. 176 The conditions that gave rise to the crisis still persist
in important respects: Incentives to exercise market power, incentives for
system integrity and reliability, incentives for new supply, incentives for
174 Repayment of both the interest during the first year and the principal in the bonds would
be delayed until after the November 2002 election under the terms of AB IX. The author of AB IX
originally expected the state to purchase no more than $10 billion in total power (including long-term
contracts), and a short-term infusion of only $500 million was expected to be sufficient to deal with
spot market purchases by the state DWR. Assemblyman Fred Keeley, Comments to Assembly
Committee on Energy Costs and Availability, State Capitol, Sacramento, Cal., (Jan. 31, 2001). A
summary of AB IX distributed at the committee hearing also includes a reference to only a $500
million transfer from the General Fund in Fiscal Year 2000-2001. Concurrence in Senate Amendments:
Hearing Before the Assembly Committee on Energy Costs and Avzilabllity, 2001-2002 Leg., Reg. Sess.
I (Cal. 2001).
175 While municipal utility customers are shielded from the direct rate impacts of the crisis,
they will directly bear much of the cost for the state's resolution as taxpayers are responsible for
reduced revenues for other state services. The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power also made
significant profits by selling excess generation into the hyper-inflated market, although former
LADWP manager David Freeman disputes charges of price-gouging.
176 The state CPUC had already stopped paying some of its contractors in spring and summer
2001 due to a shortage of funds, as reserves in the state General Fund were being siphoned off to pay
for short-term power purchases by DWR. Series of interviews with Wes Franklin, Executive Director,
California Public Utilities Commission, San Francisco, Cal. (June-Aug. 2001). State Treasurer Phil
Angelides also stated in July 2001 that the state could face fiscal insolvency if it did not sell the
revenue bonds by the end of October 2001, for such a delay would trigger a jump in the state's interest
rates from 4.14% to 7% on an existing $4.3 billion "bridge" loan. Calif. Regulators Delay Vote on
Power Plan, REUTERS, S.F., Aug. 21, 2001. PG&E filed a lawsuit against the CPUC in late-August,
2001, however, appropriately calling for CPUC hearings on the DWR request. The CPUC did not
reach a decision on the matter before the short-term debt was due, however, so the state must now pay
$800 million in additional finance costs due to the delay. PUC Chief Backs Davis, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Dec. 24, 2002, at Al. California's General Fund also faces a $9.3 billion shortfall if the bonds are not
issued by June 28, 2002. This deficit would be in addition to the massive deficit facing the state during
Fiscal Year 2002-2003. (Governor Davis' budget estimates the deficit at $12.5 billion without
significant budget cuts and delayed spending, while the state Legislative Analyst estimates the deficit
could be as high as $22 billion in Fiscal Year 2002-2003.)
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conservation, incentives to diversify supply sources, and general system
vulnerability to boom-and-bust cycles of demand growth and industry
investment are still problematic for the restructured California electricity
system. Given those conditions, there is little reason to believe the crisis of
2000 and 2001 will not repeat itself in the future.
IV. Regulation's Rationale: Reconsidering the Relevance of History to
Policy
A. The Road Not Taken: 2000-2001
How could California have avoided this outcome? Pragmatic
solutions were proposed by some of the participants who were most
familiar with the problem, but a little knowledge was a dangerous thing in
such a complex situation: Faced with what people thought were the
"facts," many of which were unfounded, anybody could easily fit them
into his or her preconceived notions of how the crisis had developed. 177
Reasonable ways out of the dilemma were constrained from serious
consideration by the limited range of American political discourse and the
tendency to equate positions with ideology. Moreover, there were
extensive conflicts of interest among some of the key decision-makers that
may have colored how they made critical choices.17 8 Finally, a quarter-
177 This includes the pronouncement of the so-called "Berkeley Manifesto," whose
signatories did not include many of the policy analysts and academics who were most familiar with the
California market structure or the behavior of market participants (e.g., members of the ISO's market
surveillance committee or others who had published research on the market's actual operation since
implementation). MANIFESTO ON THE CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY CRISIS (Jan. 26, 2001) (listing a
number of professors and others as "endorsees" of the manifesto), available at
http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/news/califomiaelectricitycrisis.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2002).
Instead, the "manifesto" appears to have been based primarily on the neoclassical economic principles
at the core of the entire deregulation project. Many of these principles are useful, but their presumptive
power constrained discourse on a full range of solutions to the California crisis. Id.
178 For example, Governor Davis's press spokesman purchased stock in June 2001 in one of
the firms being consistently praised by the Governor, while two other key consultants were working
simultaneously for Edison to promote the Edison bail-out deal. Some of the consultants to the state
would even receive a higher fee if the amount paid for Edison's transmission system were higher,
which is a perverse incentive to support unnecessary public expenditures. Several of DWR's traders
and consultants also owned stock in the companies from whom they bought power. See John Howard,
Conflicts of Power Staff Come to Light, ORANGE COUNTY REG., July 29, 2001, at 1; Richard Scheinin,
Ethics: State Officials' Energy Ethics in Question, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 11, 2001, at IF;
John Woolfolk & Noam Levey, Davis. Calpine Ties Face Questions, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug.
1, 2001, at IA. Finally, one of Davis' appointees to the Electricity Oversight Board held more than $1
million in stock in Enron while serving on the EOB. That appointee was also the Dean of the UCLA
Anderson School of Management, which produced a study with Cambridge Energy Research
Associates (a private firm with extensive consulting work for generators) that contended that market-
based solutions (i.e., letting a price shock dampen demand and induce new supply) would be preferable
to a "state takes charge" scenario. However, "[t]he report's authors acknowledge that their conclusions
are based on worst-case scenarios for the government takeover approach and best-case approach for
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century of assuming incompetence among regulators and bureaucracies
has assured their impotence when faced with a crisis of this sort. Nobody
at FERC has been there long enough to have engaged in truly effective
regulation, and the CPUC does not have the analytic horsepower on its
staff to go head-to-head with either the utilities or the wholesale generators
and sellers. Good, talented, competent people staff both agencies-but
they have not been given the tools or resources to do their jobs. Instead,
they have been told to get out of the way in order to watch the wonders of
markets at work.
When the California system collapsed from May 2000 to May 2001,
political discourse was limited primarily to physical solutions (increase
supply and/or decrease demand) or further deregulation. Changing the
structural relationships between the market and regulatory institutions was
explored almost exclusively in terms of further deregulation. The question
then became whether California had deregulated adequately rather than
whether regulators had constrained opportunistic market behavior
inadequately. The narrowness of this debate reflected both the ascendance
of the market in American political culture and the conformity of elite
interests with such ideology. Both Clinton Democrats and Bush
Republicans accepted without question the presumed superiority of
markets and the inherent inefficiency and incompetence of regulatory
bureaucracies. The predestination of deregulation was therefore taken as
immutable; the only question was as to the specific form of deregulation.
These limits of discourse clearly constrained policy debate in
resolving the California crisis, but are the political values of the broader
American citizenry really so narrow? Moreover, would the average citizen
prefer abstract ideological commitments to markets over pragmatic
solutions in the face of such a crisis? Let us explore that question by
considering a hypothetical scenario, based on the restructured California
electricity market:
Assume there are ten gasoline stations in your town, where the going
rate for gasoline is $2 per gallon. The nearest town with gasoline is 100
miles away, just as California's in-state demand is primarily dependent on
in-state suppliers. The existing gas stations can readily meet demand on all
days of the year except three-day weekends, when some stations operate
with curtailed hours if people do not fill up earlier in the week, just as the
California electricity system has adequate in-state supply during average
hydroelectric generation conditions to meet demand on all but the hottest
days of the year. One of the gas stations suddenly starts charging $25 per
the market approach." Sam Zuckerman & Carolyn Said, Study Says Crisis is Dragging Down State 's
Economy, S.F. CHRON., June 29, 2001, at Al. Such a study design should not meet the academic
standards of the University of California, yet ostensibly objective "research" like this has been used to
support policy prescriptions to support even further deregulation.
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gallon (not even on a. three-day weekend!), but it's a special kind of
gasoline station: If you do not buy at least some of your gasoline from it,
every other station in town will simultaneously stop pumping gasoline to
customers. (This is a key technological characteristic of the electrical grid,
giving any required producer remarkable market power due to the
difficulty in storing electricity economically.) Moreover, every other
station will simultaneously increase its price to $25 per gallon as soon as
you agree to buy even a single, gallon from the price-gouging station. (This
matches the PX system, where all sellers are paid the highest MCP.) What
do you think your fellow citizens would want you to do about this if you
were the Mayor? Moreover, do.you think they would stand by passively if
you did not act decisively?
Here are the policy options available to you and the citizens of your
community: (1) accelerate permit approvals for construction of more
gasoline stations, even though the basic economic and regulatory
arrangement will remain the same (and those new gas stations will not be
available until next year, and they will sit idle all but a few days each
year); (2) promote improved vehicle efficiency by requiring all new
automobiles to get higher gas mileage (although that will not help existing
car owners); (3) talk about how free markets always allocate resources
efficiently, then tell your neighbors and constituents that they should sell
their cars and start walking more; (4) enforce existing laws against price-
gouging, and pass new ones if the existing ones do not cover the situation
adequately; or (5) take over the gas station via eminent domain in order to
stabilize prices and supply until -you can build more gas stations, change
the underlying economic and regulatory arrangement that led to the
situation, and pass some new laws to ensure that it will never happen
again.
If you chose (1) above, you are eligible to become governor of
California. Opting for (2) represents an excellent long-term strategy for
avoiding future problems, so you would make an excellent appointment to
the California Energy Commission."' Choosing (3) puts you in line for an
179 It would also represent an ejcellent alternative to expanding domestic petroleum supply
through drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Increasing Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency
("CAFE") standards to forty miles per gallon would save as much petroleum each year as the total
amount imported from Middle Eastern nations to the United States. Unfortunately, the focus of energy
policy remains on expanding supply-even if those sources are questionable and have significant
environmental risks. See Neela Banerjee, Oil Industry Hesitates Over Moving Into Arctic Refuge, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2002, at 31 (discussing probable oil reserves); Job Creation Figures Vary for Oil
Drilling in Arctic, MARIN INDEP. J., Mar. 12, 2002. (discussing employment impacts estimates, which
range from 50,000 to 735,000). This focus may simply reflect the fact that eighteen of the energy
industry's top twenty-five donors to the Republican Party advised Vice President Cheney's energy task
force in 2001. Don Van Natta, Jr. & Neela Banerjee, Top G.O.P. Donors in Energy Industry Met
Cheney Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2002, at Al. It also reflects the power of vehicle manufacturers




appointment to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. It seems that
(4) is the best choice on the list, but you are not allowed to choose it
(especially if you are the governor of California or the President of the
CPUC)1 80 unless you are the Chairman of FERC.'5 ' As for (5), we all
"know" that nationalizing industry is un-American and that governments
can never run industries as cost-effectively as private enterprise. Governor
Davis therefore refused to treat (5) as a viable option, although the failure
of FERC to select (4) left no other option .for the state that would address
the underlying structural problems in the regulatory regime. Governor
Davis probably feared that seizing the former utility power plants would
kill his chances for a bid at the presidency in 2004. However, failing to
seize them in 2001 (while providing their former owners with just
compensation after the inevitable litigation) will now impose billions of
dollars of unnecessary costs on Californians, while the Governor's hardhat
ribbon-cutting ceremonies have only given the appearance that the
problem has been addressed.
I believe an overwhelming majority of Americans would have
insisted upon seizing the gasoline stations (or former utility power plants)
if they were actually presented with this scenario in their communities.' 82
Moreover, what I've described grossly understates the case: When the
state paid $3,800 per MWh for power during the spring 2001, it was
actually paying the equivalent of $250 per gallon of gasoline (ten times the
figure used in the example above). 83 Is there any doubt, then, that the state
should have seized the power plants in January 2001 via eminent domain
when rolling blackouts began to hit the. state? FERC had already walked
off the job, thus eliminating the moderate middle ground-a regulated
wholesale market where price-gouging is restrained by enforcement of
existing laws if it violates the "just and reasonable" standard of the Federal
New York Times editorialized, Congress "must do better in standing up for the public interest" rather
than special interests. Editorial, A Failure of Energy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2002, at A22.
180 Both the Governor and the CPUC President formally called on FERC to enforce the law
to prevent price-gouging and to order refunds to California utilities and consumers for prior abuses.
Their pleas fell on deaf ears at FERC.
181 FERC went through three chairmen during the California crisis: James Hoecker, Curt
Herbert, Jr., and Patrick Wood Ill. William Massey is the only FERC commissioner who consistently
called for stronger regulation.
182 State Treasurer Phil Angelides and Senate Leader John Burton both publicly called for a
state takeover during early 2001, but Republican legislative leaders objected even to state purchase of
the utilities' transmission systems or hydroelectric power plants. The State Senate Rules Committee
approved a nonbinding resolution in July 2001 that the Senate would support seizure of the former
utility power plants if the Governor were to do so, under his emergency powers. Carl Ingram, Senate
Panel's Resolution Backs Power Plant Seizures, L.A. TIMES, July 3,2001, at B 10.
183 Wholesale spot market prices were $20 to $40 per MWh in 1998 and 1999, so $3800
divided by $30 equals an increase by a factor of about 127 times. Gasoline that costs $2 per gallon
would therefore increase to about $250 per gallon. The $25 per gallon figure used in the example is
roughly proportional (compared to $2 per gallon gasoline) to the average price increase in California's
wholesale spot market from 1999 to 2000.
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Power Act.' 84 Even the moderate Republicans of San Diego did a 180-
degree turn on deregulation after they experienced the full brunt of
International Monetary Fund-style structural adjustment: While
ideologically committed to market solutions until summer 2000, they were
generally in favor of public ownership of the electric utility industry by fall
2000. The same would have been true throughout the state if PG&E and
Edison customers had faced the volatility of the wholesale spot market in
2000 and 200 1. 85
Republican CPUC Commissioner Richard Bilas, who was appointed
by Governor Pete Wilson and calls himself "a free market economist"
(with a Ph.D. in economics), 8 6  concluded in January 2001 that
condemnation was necessary when the CPUC was finally forced to raise
retail rates. In a little-noticed concurrence to the CPUC decision that
ultimately increased rates by $5.7 billion per year, Bilas stated:
[T]he surest way out of this dilemma is for the Legislature to
immediately establish a California Power Authority to set the rules of the
game and to have the power of condemnation at fair market value over in
state generation. Calls for behavior modification have not worked. Action
must be taken.
187
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, of course, prohibits the
"taking" of private property for public use without just compensation, but
184 Note that the Federal Power Act limits such behavior even when it might not otherwise
be in violation of anti-trust laws. The latter precludes collusive behavior or practices that establish
monopoly control over a market, but may not preclude some of the strategic behavior (if unilateral)
that led to price spikes in California in 2000 and 2001.
185 Exposure of nearly the entire state to the volatility of the wholesale spot market would
have been an economic disaster, but it also would have led to swifter and more comprehensive action
by political leaders. SDGandE customers account for only about ten percent of the state's citizens, so
the potential political ramifications of the high wholesale spot market prices were "contained" through
immediate rate relief for San Diego customers (without adopting a comprehensive program to deal
with the underlying structural issues). The political response to statewide price spikes of that
magnitude would have stopped deregulation and restructuring everywhere in its tracks in the United
States.
186 Bilas resigned from the CPUC in the winter of 2002 with ten months left in his term,
complaining about excessive control by the Governor's office over the ostensibly independent agency.
Governor Davis quickly appointed Michael Peevey, a former Edison executive and the spouse of a
Davis ally in the State Assembly, to fill Bilas' unexpired term on the CPUC. Consumer advocates are
dismayed, fearing that Peevey will now guide the CPUC toward an Edison-style bailout of PG&E that
will leave captive "core" utility customers facing even greater rate increases over a longer period of
time. Stuart Leavenworth, Davis Names Ex-Edison Chief to PUC, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 6, 2002, at
A3.
187 Interim Opinion Regarding Emergency Requests for Rate Increases, Cal. Pub. Utils.
Comm'n, Applications 00-11-038, 00-11-056, 00-10-028, (Jan. 4, 2001) (Bilas, concurring for Item 2)
(on file with author). Ironically, Bilas quoted Adam Smith in supporting his conclusion that market
power was the problem-because Smith, like Bilas, recognized that the invisible hand could only work
if there was true competition. In particular, Bilas noted Smith's concern about allowing industry
representatives to associate to allow collusion.
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a "just" price to be paid for those power plants would presumably not
include the value of profits that could only be realized if FERC did not
enforce existing law.' This above-market return is what existing owners
have now been able to extract from the state through both spot market
sales in 2000 and 2001 and long-term contracts for the next ten to twenty
years.
But different choices were made, because the public was kept in the
dark and never really understood the financial ramifications of the crisis or
the magnitude of the price gouging. "Dollars per MWh" are too abstract; if
it really had been a question of $25 or $250 per gallon of gasoline, there
would have been rioting in the streets. The question of public versus
private power is therefore now moot in California: The state has what is
effectively a disabled public power system now because the state has
stepped in and negotiated away its future to make the short-term political
problem go away quietly. The only difference between California's system
and the public power systems developed the old-fashioned way is that no
portion of the California system is now actually owned or controlled by the
public.18 9 The new system is also not likely to be responsive to public
concerns, for control over it is buried within a bureaucracy that is subject
188 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating "nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation"). There is no suggestion here that these constitutional protections should be
violated. The Takings Clause has been read to mean that private property can only be taken for "public
use," but the definition of public use has been treated as "coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's
police powers." Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (allowing the State of Hawaii to
take title in real property from lessors and to transfer it to lessees in order to reduce the concentration
of ownership of fees simple in the State). Given the state of emergency in California in 2001,
condemnation in order to maintain an operating electrical system would surely meet this standard. The
standard for reviewing "just compensation" relies upon an analysis of market value. Market value, in
turn, would be based on expected profits from the assets, which would necessarily be considered
within the constraints of legal market behavior. The new owners of the former utility-owned facilities
attempted to reduce the assessed valuation of their power plants shortly before the crisis, and
widespread industry forecasts projected only a short period of capacity shortages. Owners also had the
ability to contract for lower natural gas prices than those on the spot market through longer-term
contracts. The "distinct investment-backed expectations" of the power plant owners would therefore
reflect much lower expected revenues or profits than those they actually realized in 2000 and 2001
(and will realize under long-term contracts with the DWR for the next ten to twenty years). Cf Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (establishing a balancing test analysis for takings
claims that considers the distinct investment-backed expectations of the property owner in determining
just compensation). For a detailed discussion of recent takings jurisprudence (focusing on regulatory
"takings"), see ROBERT MELTZ ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON LAND USE
CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (1999).
189 This could conceivably change with the establishment of the California Consumer Power
and Conservation Financing Authority ("CPA") in late-August 2001, which has the authority to build
power plants or to condemn existing facilities in the state via eminent domain. It is unlikely to do so,
however, for Governor Davis appoints all of its directors and there is strong Republican opposition to a
strong state role. Daryl Kelley, State Power Authority To Take Reins Today, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 24,
2001, at BI; Carrie Peyton, New Panel Pledges: 'No More Blackouts', SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 25,
2001, at A3. Moreover, the DWR's longer term contracts seriously constrain any significant future role
for the CPA for the near term.
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to the usual concerns about patronage and insularity.19° This approach
gives new meaning to the phrase "public-private partnership." In this case,
the public simply provides the money while the private sector provides the
monopoly power to keep the lights on. It is the result of, and perpetuates,
an incredibly asymmetrical relationship, and it institutionalizes a set of
economic and political incentives that will come back to haunt the citizens
of the state.' 9'
B. California's Legacy. 2000-?
French researcher Jean-Michel Glachant has studied electric industry
deregulation and restructuring throughout the world, and he chose to
examine the California experiment in 1998 due to the state's reputation for
innovation. "But it is like Africa!" he cried in disbelief in San Diego in
August 2000.192 Three months later, he said, "[I]t is much worse now-
more like Bosnia" or some other war-torn country. He was referring to the
apparent lawlessness and total lack of regulatory control over generators
and sellers in those days between FERC's draft order'93 and its "final"
order' 94 in the California case.' 95 The leading explanation at the time was a
190 Large public power authorities have not generally been very responsible environmental
stewards, for example, as demonstrated by the Tennessee Valley Authority, Bonneville Power
Administration, or Los Angeles Department of Water and Power. Public power agencies have also
made some major economic blunders, such as the default on bonds by the Washington Public Power
Supply System for nuclear power plants in the early 1980s.
191 The DWR sought "carte blanche" rate recovery authority from the CPUC in 2001, for
example, while only providing future revenue need estimates through 2002. Granting such authority
would exaggerate existing political incentives to push costs and future rate increases beyond the
November 2002 election, only to then incorporate other bureaucratic costs into rates due to DWR's
ability to "tax" electric ratepayers. DWR Numbers Put Through the Wringer by PG&E; CPUC Will
Want Details Clarified Before Approval, CAL. ENERGY MARKETS No. 628, July 30, 2001; Kate Berry,
Utilities Might Stall Bond Sale, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Aug. 3, 2001, at M; Dale Kasler, Dispute
Threatens State's Bond Sale, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 7, 2001, at A3; Press Release, PG&E Co.,
PG&E Comments on DWR Revenue Demand, Aug. 14, 2001, available at
http://www.pge.com/006 news/006anews rel/010814.shtml (last visited Apr. 14, 2002). As noted
above, both the CPUC and the Governor are now trying to renegotiate terms of those long-term
contracts after extensive criticism and in the face of lower demand. See Peyton, supra note 164, at A5.
The CPUC agreed ifi February 2002 to give DWR enough rate recovery authority to allow the sale of
state revenue bonds to go forward in order to avoid an additional $9.3 billion deficit in late June 2002.
See supra note 176 and accompanying text; Taugher, supra note 164.
192 Interview with Jean Michel Glachant, Universitd Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne, in San
Diego, Cal. (Aug. 23, 2000). Dr. Glachant and I served on an expert witness panel before the CPUC in
Proceeding No. OI 00-08-002. By May 2001, the New York Times was referring to Brazil's "rapidly
worsening energy crisis that threatens to cripple Latin America's largest economy" as offering
"Califomia-style blackouts." Larry Rohter, Brazil, Fearful of Blackouts, Orders 20% Cut in
Electricity, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2001, at A4; Larry Rohter, Energy Crisis in Brazil Brings Dim Lights
and Altered Lives, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2001, at Al (describing "a Califomia-style energy crisis"). The
Golden State by then had a less reliable and cost-effective electricity system than many developing
countries. See id.
193 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 93 F.E.R.C. 61,121 (2000) (order proposing remedies).
194 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 93 F.E.R.C. 61,294 (2001) (final order).
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shortage of supply relative to demand, but the facts do not support this
conclusion. The central featdre of the 2000-2001 California Energy Crisis
is, instead, the failure of both state and federal regulatory institutions to
regulate opportunistic market behavior by generators and traders. There
were certainly flaws in the design of the market, but the crisis, in essence,
was caused more fundamentally by a failure to understand, or fully
appreciate, regulation's rationale.
To be sure, increased supply and, more importantly, decreased
demand in 2001 lessened the risk of rolling blackouts and decreased the
ability of generators and traders to exercise market power. Californians
reduced overall consumption by nearly 7% and peak demand by roughly
10% in the summer of 2001 compared to the summer of 2000, creating a
margin between supply and demand that significantly lessened any seller's
ability to exercise market power. 
6
Other factors also helped to discipline the unruly market behavior
seen between May 2000 and May 2001. Generous long-term contracts for
power created new incentives for generators and traders to provide power
in order to avoid further scrutiny. California also restructured the board of
the ISO to make it more effective and less likely to be captured by
generator or sellers' interests, but the new structure put it under direct
political control by the Governor. 97 (Davis appointees achieved such
dominance on the PUC starting in January 2001.)'9' Although it was not
195 Interview with Jean-Michel Glachant, Universit& Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne, in Berkeley,
Cal. (Nov. 13, 2000).
196 Berkeley researcher Severin Borenstein and CEC member Art Rosenfeld advocated a
shift to limited real-time pricing during winter 2001 for commercial and industrial customers, but the
CPUC resisted their proposal and the state instead spent more than $1 billion for a series of other
programs to reduce demand. SEVERIN BORENSTEIN, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT
IMPLEMENTING REAL-TIME ELECTRICITY PRICING IN CALIFORNIA FOR SUMMER 2001,
http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/ucei/PDF/faq.pdf (last visited May 2, 2002); Borenstein, supra note 155;
Art Rosenfeld, Comments to Assembly Committee on Energy Costs and Availability, State Capitol,
Sacramento, Cal., (Jan. 31, 2001); Andrew LaMar, Residents Cut Energy Use by 6. 7 Percent Last
Year, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at A5. Peak demand in June 2001 was down nearly
fourteen percent, and the gains occurred despite having temperatures similar to 2000. LaMar, supra
note 196.
197 FERC remains opposed to this new governance structure, however, taking a position that
the ISO should truly be a technical organization that is independent of direct political influence. The
old structure of both the ISO and PX reflected a "stakeholder" governance structure, where key
stakeholder groups (e.g., generators, utilities, consumers, environmentalists) had representatives on a
large, unwieldy board of directors.
198 Governor Davis appointed former govemor Jerry Brown's cousin Geoffrey F. Brown to
the CPUC in January 2001. Brown had no experience in utility regulatory matters during his career as
San Francisco's Public Defender, but his appointment allowed Senate Leader John Burton's daughter
to move into Brown's former position as Public Defender. She was subsequently defeated for election
to the office in March 2002. Davis's other appointees were President Loretta Lynch (former head of
his Office of Planning and Research) and Carl Wood (who had extensive electric utility experience and
led the utility workers' union). As noted supra note 186, Davis appointed former Edison executive
Michael Peevey to the Commission in March 2002. Davis has therefore now appointed four of the five
members of the CPUC, and he controls who is President.
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operational until August 2001, state legislation adopted in May 2001
creating the California Power Authority also helped to establish an
important public power presence for the state in the marketplace-with the
power of eminent domain over generator behavior.' 99
The most important changes, however, came in the halls of
Washington, D.C. Bipartisan legislation by Senators Dianne Feinstein and
Gordon Smith would have required FERC "to impose just and reasonable
load-differentiated demand rates or cost-of-service based rates on sales by
public utilities" throughout the WSCC within sixty days.200 The effect of
this legislation would have been to impose temporary wholesale price caps
based on the old cost-of-service model of utility regulation. The bill, co-
authored by Senators Jeff Bingaman, Patricia Murray, and Maria Cantwell,
took on new life when Senator Jim Jeffords dropped his GOP affiliation,
giving Democrats control of the Senate and its committee chairmanships.
The bill was suddenly likely to pass in both the Senate Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources, now chaired by Bingaman, and on the
Senate floor. Senator Joe Lieberman also promptly called FERC on the
carpet in his government oversight committee, and House GOP members
worried that they might soon have to vote on the Feinstein-Smith bill on
the floor. Ideology aside, there was simply no way that California's
Republican members of Congress would be able to face their constituents
with a vote against regulatory price caps. California's connection to the
rest of the West had already led to high wholesale market prices and retail
rate increases throughout the region, leading to business bankruptcies and
shutdowns to save power. The California crisis clearly had regional and
national ramifications, and the Bush Administration could not continue to
call it a California problem without suffering the consequences. Governor
Davis made that point plainly when he held a brief twenty-minute
"summit" with President Bush in the late spring. Bush walked away with a
black eye as the New York Times cited the administration's "indifference
to California."' 0 '
And, so, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission decided to
reinvestigate the relevance of the "R" in FERC. The agency ordered
199 SB 6X, signed by Governor Davis in May 2001, established the California Consumer
Power and Conservation Financing Authority (also known as the California Power Authority) in late-
August 2001. Kelley, supra note 189; Carrie Peyton, supra note 189; Rick Jurgens, PUC Sends Plan to
State, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Feb. 15, 2002, at DI; Carrie Peyton, Post-Blackout Role Elusive for
California Power Authority, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 19, 2002, at A3. The Power Authority was not
operational during the heat of the crisis from May 2000 to May 2001, so it had little impact on
generator behavior during that time.
Davis appointed long-time public utility executive S. David Freeman to head the agency, whose
career includes leadership of the Tennessee Valley Authority, Sacramento Municipal Utility District,
Lower Colorado River Authority, and the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power.
200 S. 764, 107th Cong. (2001).
201 Editorial, Indifference to California, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2001, at A26.
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limited refunds on March 9, 2001,202 adopted limited price caps for limited
periods (less than 3% of the hours in which the ISO had found evidence of
market power) on April 26,203 and then expanded them on June 19 to cover
all hours and all market participants throughout the West until September
30, 2002.204 The agency also finally began hearings into the CPUC's
allegations about gas price manipulation (fully a year after the CPUC
filing), which quickly revealed that there was ample evidence to support
the allegations. 20 5 Finally, FERC held a two-week settlement conference
among generators, sellers, utilities, and the state on electricity issues in
early July (California was seeking $8.9 billion in refunds at the time). The
parties remain billions of dollars apart, but the FERC ALJ tentatively
proposed adoption of an analytic methodology that could lead to billions
of dollars of refunds. Only a small portion of that is likely to be ordered by
FERC itself, but the conceptual method initially adopted is precisely the
same as that used by ISO analysts and academic studies. California may
therefore be able to recover in court what it cannot get through FERC.2 °6
So the sheriff is back in town. Former FERC Chair Curt Herbert, Jr.
has now been replaced by Patrick Wood I1.207 It remains to be seen if
202 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 94 F.E.R.C. 61,245 (2001) (order directing sellers to
provide refunds).
203 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 95 F.E.R.C. 61,115 (2001) (order establishing prospective
mitigation and monitoring plan and establishing investigation).
204 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 95 F.E.R.C. 61,418 (2001) (order on rehearing of
monitoring and mitigation plan); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 96 F.E.R.C. 61,120 (2001) (order
establishing evidentiary hearing procedures); Hearings Established on Refunds in California, Pacific
Northwest, DM&H ENERGY INSIGHTS, Jul. 27, 2001, at 1, available at
http://www.duanemorris.com/publications/ei072701.pdf. The ISO has nevertheless found that
generators continue to exceed the FERC-imposed wholesale market rate caps. Nancy Vogel, Federal
Caps Didn't Deter Higher Prices, L.A. TIMES, Jul. 27, 2001, at BI.
205 David Maharaj & Christine Hanley, Suit Claims Firms Limited Gas Supply To Raise
Prices, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2001, at Al; Tansey, supra note 138, at Al. The ALJ's ultimate
recommendation to FERC called for throwing out most of the complaint, however, despite such prima
facie evidence. See Oppel, supra note 141, at C4.
206 FERC has determined that it does not have jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act to
order refunds for any transactions before October 6, 2000. Public power sources also dispute FERC's
claim of jurisdiction over their transactions in wholesale power markets. The FERC methodology may
nevertheless be the basis for litigation that could recover some refunds or damages for transactions not
covered by any FERC refund order. The FERC Administrative Law Judge was originally scheduled to
issue a draft decision in October 2001, and then March 2002, but he has now delayed any decision in
the matter until at least August 2002. David Whitney, Hearings on State Energy Refunds Are Halted,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 8, 2001, at A4; FERCALJ Points to August for His Calif Refunds Decision,
MEGAWATT DAILY, Jan. 9, 2002, at 1. FERC appears to have limited its methodology further to
establish price caps rather than proxy prices, however, which has driven down the California refund
claim to something just over $1 billion. Cal-ISO Refund Estimate Drops More Than $7 Billion, CAL.
ENERGY MARKETS No. 658, Mar. 1, 2002. The total amount of overpayments compared to what the
regulated system would have cost is nevertheless probably closer to the original estimate, because the
ISO's methodology estimates the actual costs of producing power supplied in the market. Litigation on
this issue is likely to take years.
207 Zachary Coile, Energy Chair To Leave Post After 7 Months, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 7, 2001,
at A8. Wood has stated that FERC needs to become a "market cop with a great big old stick," because
"the free market ain't a free and full market yet." Judy Pastemak & Alan C. Miller, Watchdogs Take a
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FERC will have any real effect through actual refund orders,20 ' but the
psychological effect of potential regulatory oversight has already been felt.
Existing power plants are on-line again, bids for the power from those
plants are less outrageous, and the most egregious behavior of May 2000
to May 2001 seems to have abated.2°9
But the California story is far from over. Investigations into market
manipulation continue, hampered by recalcitrant companies' refusal to
provide even subpoenaed information to the CPUC, California Attorney
General, or the California State Legislature: The California State Senate
committee investigating price manipulation was so frustrated in its efforts
that it voted to issue the first contempt citations in the Legislature since
1929. Not surprisingly, one of the two firms cited was Enron-where a
culture of unaccountability was pervasive, and where the corporation
denied any jurisdictional authority over it by any state agency in
California.210 This attitude led Attorney General Bill Lockyer to say that
he personally wanted to arrest Enron Chairman Kenneth Lay and escort
him to a jail cell if Lay were to step foot in California again. 211
It is difficult to find a "smoking gun," let alone any "smoke signals"
that may have been used to collude tacitly in the California market,
without access to evidence. It is, therefore, quite premature to determine
whether either existing laws were broken or whether new laws need to be
passed to protect consumers against the behaviors that caused the
California crisis. What is clear is that there arb asymmetrical incentives for
scarcity for owners of generation facilities in a market like California's:
Apparent shortages increase market power and profits as long as regulation
is lax. Equally true, however, is that there are few incentives to create such
Hit in State's Power Ills, L.A. TIMES, Jun. 3, 2001, at Al (quoting Patrick H. Wood III). He also says
that he wants FERC to be "a vigilant market cop walking the beat." Eric Nalder & Mark Gladstone,
New Market Overwhelms U.S. Agency Probe of Rising Power Prices Falls Short As Federal Agency
Regulatory Commission Needed More Data, Analysis of Costs, Economists Say, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, June 4, 2001, at IA (quoting Patrick H. Wood lII).
208 Until 2001, FERC had ordered a total of $598 in refunds in its history for "unjust and
unreasonable" rates. Frontline: Blackout, supra note 80. FERC ordered Williams to pay $10 million in
March 2001 for physical manipulation in April 2000 in plants operated with AES, and Williams agreed
to pay $8 million in refunds in May 2001. Ray, supra note 144.
209 But see Nancy Vogel, Federal Caps Didn't Deter Higher Prices, L.A. TIMES, Jul. 27,
2001, at B I (reporting that the ISO continues to see evidence of strategic bidding in the first week
following imposition of caps).
210 Lynda Gledhill, Two Power Firms Held in Contempt by State Senate Panel, S.F. CHRON.,
June 29, 2001, at A6 (reporting that the Senate panel also named Mirant, an affiliate of the Southern
Company, in its action). Legislators also heard testimony from former Duke Energy employees that
they were manipulating output to increase market prices. Employees: Power Supply Held Down,
SACRAMENTO BEE, June 22, 2001, at A3. Duke has denied the allegations, claiming that the ISO
ordered it to vary power output to maintain system conditions.
211 State Reacts to Enron's Struggle, MARIN INDEP. J., Nov. 29, 2001, at B4.
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shortages and many incentives to eliminate possible shortages under
traditional utility regulation.212
Conclusion
"The real lesson of the California catastrophe," said Paul Krugman,
"was that the concerns that led to regulation in the first place-monopoly
power and the threat -of market manipulation-are still real issues
today. 21 3 This fundamental historical lesson should be the legacy of the
California crisis: that there is still a rationale for regulation, and there are
times when regulators must actually regulate.
The FERC order regulating wholesale electricity prices in California
and throughout the West is scheduled to expire on September 30, 2002-
but, if it does expire then, we as a society may soon find ourselves with a
repeat of the California crisis of 2000 to 2001. We may not face it
immediately due to dampened demand and increased capacity, but demand
will continue to press supply capacity in future years until generators and
traders can again take advantage of relative scarcity to exercise market
power. There is very little downside risk for the perpe!rators of such
behavior unless and until FERC properly enforces the Federal Power Act.
Relying on anti-trust statutes is much more difficult, for they require that
collusion be demonstrated. The electricity market is one where collusion is
not even necessary to result in behavior that transfers wealth from
consumers to generators and traders without improving either economic
efficiency or social well-being.214  Such behavior also weakens the
reliability of the electric grid, threatening both lives and livelihoods. This
is why the industry was originally regulated: Both history and a
212 Due to that asymmetry, it is likely that many of the proposed (and even some of the
recently-permitted) power plants in Califonfia will not actually come on-line to produce power unless
they already have long-term contracts. Not building a permitted power plant is a rational strategy for
anyone already owning generation in an easily manipulated market. Proposing new generation that one
never intends to build is also rational: It will discourage market entrants, thereby extending the
potential period of scarcity. The unregulated system therefore has inherent incentives for undercapacity
and scarcity unless there is adequate forward contracting. The new California Power Authority was
established in part to avoid such scarcity, with a mandate to ensure a fifteen percent reserve margin.
See Kelley, supra note 189; Peyton, supra note 189. It is unclear how the CPA will meet this task in
light of the enormous uncertainty it faces about whether and when unregulated power plants will be
on-line. The long-term DWR contracts will also constrain the CPA in any effort to diversify the state's
generating portfolio, because there is little need now for the next few years.
213 Paul Krugman, Enron Goes Overboard, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2001, at A19.
214 Although he only analyzed data for the first two years of the California market, Steven
Puller found evidence of static (independently-exercised) market power but no statistically significant
evidence of dynamic (collusive) market power. See STEVEN L. PULLER, PRICING AND FIRM CONDUCT
IN CALIFORNIA'S DEREGULATED ELECTRICITY MARKET (Program on Workable Energy Regulation,
Working Paper No. PWP-080, Jan. 2001), available at http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/
ueei/PDF/pwp080.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2002). Whether that is true for May 2000 to May 2001 is a
critical legal question.
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sophisticated technical understanding of electricity markets demonstrate
that this is an industry that is too susceptible to abuse to be left free of
regulatory oversight. That was regulation's original rationale, and it
remains valid today despite the many benefits that some deregulation in
other sectors has brought.
As Steve Weissman has noted, the choice over whether to deregulate
California's electricity system promised a relatively small potential up-side
benefit in the form of moderately reduced rates and improved efficiency at
the risk of huge downside costs and decreased reliability.215 Most people
are risk-averse and buy insurance in that situation-by making long-term
commitments of a small amount of resources (e.g., through insurance
premiums) to avoid exposure to the low-probability, high-cost event (e.g.,
a house fire). This is precisely what the cost-of-service model of regulation
provided for society from the 1920s until the 1990s: insurance against
market manipulation, volatile prices and outages in exchange for a
relatively small penalty in inefficiency.216
In response to the Enron scandal, Treasury Undersecretary for
Domestic Finance Peter Fisher said, "If rules were broken, rule breakers
should be punished. If rules were bent, we should improve the means of
enforcing those rules. And if loopholes were used, new rules should be
written.' 217 The inquiry in California so far focused on only the first of
these three responses, yet both the enforcement impotence of regulators in
the face of a politically powerful industry and the extensive legal
loopholes for opportunistic price gouging in the current regulatory
environment need serious attention. This is the challenge if anything useful
is to be learned from the California crisis: How should we now structure
the relationship between regulatory institutions and markets in the
electricity sector? The policy debate about that question should be based
on the empirical evidence from the California crisis rather than merely the
theoretical ideals of economists' models. There has been plenty of
simplistic rhetoric about the California debacle, but many of the
commonly-held assumptions that have permeated the debate and colored
the policy choices made in the heat of the crisis are simply wrong. A
combination of misunderstanding, mischaracterization, and misdiagnosis
of the California crisis has resulted in policy responses that generally fail
to address the underlying structural causes of the crisis.
215 Steve Weissman, California Public Utilities Commission, Comments at the Envisioning
California Conference, The Year of Our Disconnect-the Politics of Power in California, Sacramento,
Cal. (Oct. 5, 2001).
216 See supra Part 1.
217 Kathleen Day & Peter Behr, Andersen Considered Severing Enron Ties; February E-
Mail Shows Concerns About Accounting, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2002, at Al.
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It is difficult to blame either politicians or journalists for some of the
misunderstandings; erroneous claims perpetuate themselves through
repetition. I found four to five factual errors per story in some of the major
California newspapers when rolling blackouts first hit in January 2001,
although that number dropped to just one to two errors per story over the
next few months.21 Some of those errors-especially the notion that
California's restructuring effort caused California not to build any new
generating capacity in the 1990s--continue to persist today. In fact, utility-
owned generating capacity did decline slightly from 45,876 MW in 1990
to 44,493 MW in 1998. Non-utility generating capacity more than made up
the difference, however, increasing from 8,109 MW to 10,386 MW during
the same period. Non-utility generators therefore added 2,277 MW of
capacity to the in-state grid from 1990 to 1998. The state then added
another 2,781 MW of capacity in 1999. These total additions of 5,058 MW
are equivalent to adding ten large 500 MW plants. 19 One of the
fundamental premises of the public policy debate-that California had not
added any new generating capacity in the 1990s-was therefore simply
wrong. Yet, public misperception of the relationship between supply and
demand drove both the policy discourse and the selected course of action.
What should we have done instead? As illustrated above, there was
some point in early 2001 when the Governor should have seized the
former utility power plants (all "in-state" facilities owned by "out-of-state"
companies) under his emergency powers to stop the price gouging and
rolling blackouts. If ever the use of "police power" was warranted, this
was it. This option never received serious political consideration, however,
because the public was kept in the dark about the structural causes of the
crisis. Power plant seizures would have dramatically altered the terms of
negotiation between the state, ratepayers, the utilities, the generators, and
traders. State ownership would have temporarily stabilized the electrical
system itself while offering breathing room to decide what type of long-
term institutional reform was appropriate. Moreover, such stability
probably could have averted PG&E's bankruptcy filing, with California's
greater capacity to predict and control future utility rates, including
allocation of some portion of those rates to address the utilities' financial
condition. Seizing the power plants in early 2001, therefore, would have
maximized flexibility for resolving the structural causes of the crisis.
218 In sharp contrast, the small San Diego County North County Times had sophisticated
coverage as early as fall 2000-because area residents (and reporters) had already been living with the
crisis for several months by then.
219 FISHER & DUANE, supra note 50, tbl.E-3; Fisher & Duane, supra note 50.
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Longer-term policy options could have then been considered without the
daily threat of further rolling blackouts.22°
At one end of the spectrum, California could have then continued to
own and operate (and even build new) power plants through the new
California Power Authority to avoid a repeat of the 2000 to 2001 crisis.
None of the public utilities in California faced shortages during 2000 and
2001; so it is difficult to argue that public utilities are inherently unable to
ensure system reliability or that the conditions in 2000 and 2001 were
beyond the control of utility planners. A return to cost-of-service
regulation would also be possible because the former utility power plants
could be sold by California back to the utilities or to new owners with
firmer restrictions on operations and incentives to operate in the public
interest. Finally, a more competitive market could still be pursued after
state seizure of the power plants (although, understandably, the climate for
further investment in the electricity sector in California would be clouded).
The institutional structure for such a market would need to be based on a
firm grasp of the analysis presented here, or the conditions of 2000 and
2001 would likely be replicated in the future.
Perhaps the best solution would be a return to the "California model"
of the late-1980s and early-1990s, which balanced concerns about system
reliability and price stability against the inherent inefficiencies of relying
only on central planners to determine the means of meeting demand.
Regulation's rationale would still be recognized, in other words, but so
would the power of the market to find the most efficient means of meeting
an identified need. There were problems with this system, of course, but it
represented a reasonable accommodation of all three of the policy goals of
the regulatory regime: (1) system reliability, (2) rate stability, and (3)
efficiency. These three goals are the three legs of the electricity system
stool. They cannot all be maximized simultaneously: If we want to
maximize efficiency, sacrifices must be made in system reliability and rate
stability. The advocates of electricity deregulation project claim that there
are no tradeoffs: If society would simply trust in the power of the market,
it would be able to maximize all three of these policy goals. They are
wrong.
220 Although it is difficult to imagine the state government of California negotiating under
duress, that is precisely what gave rise to the long-term contracts it entered into in the spring of 2001.
The Attorney General had a budget of $4 million to investigate illegal market manipulation at the
time-which is equal to the increased revenue the former utility plants could earn in just one hour of
getting the MCP up to the old price cap of $250 per MWh. The generators and traders extracted $40
billion in additional revenues from California ratepayers in 2000 to 2001 (much of that amount may
have then been paid to gas suppliers or for the purchase of air emission credits, of course). Their
potential war chest to defend litigation challenging market manipulation is therefore up to 10,000 times
the Attorney General's. The only way to change that asymmetrical power relationship was to take the
tools of potential market manipulation out of their hands.
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Moreover, advocates of deregulation are wrong about what people
want from the electricity system. If given a choice, the public would
generally choose system reliability and rate stability, even if it means
giving something up in efficiency.221 It certainly would prefer the first two
goals if all it is giving up is a possibility of greater efficiency. Yet that is
what Enron and the other deregulation advocates really offered: In
exchange for the possibility of relatively small efficiency gains, society
was asked to incur a risk of dramatic reductions in system reliability and
rate stability. Moreover, there was a real risk that prices would go up
instead of down after deregulation. How else were the new owners of the
former utility plants going to pay off their investments at twice the book
value of the plants? That outcome is, in fact, what Californians received
from AB 1890-style restructuring.
What can FERC, Congress, and other states learn from the California
crisis? Despite all of the complex details of the California disaster, the
lessons are really quite simple. Moreover, they go to the heart of our
political culture and the limits on contemporary political discourse after
two decades of increasing attention to economists' concerns about
efficiency and a strong rightward shift in American politics. They go, in
other words, to a fundamental question of American politics: What should
be the relationship between regulators and markets?
It should be clear by now that social institutions structure human
relations in any market. If the structure of those social institutions is
inadequate or inappropriate, markets alone (together with the asymmetrical
power relations that may exist in particular circumstances between buyers
and sellers) will dominate the structure of human relations. The California
debacle shows conclusively that the resulting structure and relations are
unacceptable in the electricity sector. The specific technological
characteristics of the industry make it especially vulnerable to market
manipulation, while the central importance of electricity to our society and
economy make it socially unacceptable to allow such vulnerability.
Regulation, therefore, has an important role to play for electricity, and it
may still be preferable to "put the genie back in the bottle" by re-
establishing a regulated system, despite some of the inherent inefficiencies
in such a system, in exchange for relieving ourselves of the risks and costs
of the unfettered market. It is certainly worth considering again along with
the public power option-rather than simply assuming that markets are the
answer. In this case, we would do well to make sure we first understand
the question more precisely. In the case of electricity, the relevant question
is how to improve efficiency without sacrificing system reliability or price
221 This is consistent with what William Golove found in his survey research of consumers.
Golove, supra note 75.
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stability. This is a different question from how to deregulate another
industry that seems stodgy and bureaucratic.
California's experience offers some sober lessons for both
policymakers and the broader public in light of Enron's subsequent
collapse. Together, they should bring pause to the deregulation project. Let
us hope that regulation's rationale will not be forgotten the next time
somebody promises a free lunch through deregulation and its abstract-
sounding and presumably non-threatening euphemism, restructuring. For
the vast majority of us who did not have enough insider knowledge to cash
out our Enron stocks and options before the price collapsed,222 we should
buy some insurance as a society now to make sure we do not face a similar
disaster again.
222 Enron was formerly the seventh-largest company in the country, based on market
valuation and questionable accounting, but by January 2002 the firm's shares were trading for less than
a dollar, after having reached a high near $90 per share. Insiders managed to extract $1.1 billion in
value from their stocks and options before the plunge. Leslie Wayne, Before Debacle, Enron Insiders
Cashed in $1.1 Billion in Shares, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at Al.
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